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RECONSTRUCTING WORLD POLITICS:  
NORMS, DISCOURSE, AND COMMUNITY 
 
Sungjoon Cho* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article argues that the conventional (rationalist) approach to world 
politics characterized by political bargain cannot fully capture the new 
social reality under the contemporary global ambience where ideational 
factors such as ideas, values, culture, and norms have become more salient 
and influential not only in explaining but also in prescribing state behaviors.  
After bringing rationalism’s paradigmatic limitations into relief, the Article 
offers a sociological framework that highlights a reflective, intersubjective 
communication among states and consequent norm-building process.  
Under this new paradigm, one can understand an international organization 
as a “community” (Gemeinschaft), not as a mere contractual instrument of 
its contracting parties (Gesellschaft).  The Article applies the new paradigm 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as it describes the WTO’s 
institutional evolution from a power-oriented, tariff-reducing contract to a 
norm-oriented world trade community.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Two months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered in the Qatari capital, Doha.  
Glued by the exigency of the time, they launched an audacious trade 
negotiation round for the main purpose of reducing or eliminating chronic 
agricultural protection in developed countries.1  WTO members were 
desperate to send the post-9/11 world a clear message that would 
reverberate even to the marginalized lands: “development.”  To the 
embarrassment of the WTO itself and its members, a decade of tedious, and 
torturous, talks hardly delivered anything, leaving the Doha Round in 
tatters.2  While the Doha crisis must be one of the darkest hours of the 
WTO’s history, it offers, in irony, a rare opportunity to testify about the 
gestalt of an international organization.  Its conventional postmortems 
invariably assign the debacle to the lack of convergence in trade interests of 
key negotiating members, such as the U.S., the EU, China, and India.3  This 
                                                 
1
 In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, WTO members highlighted that “the 
majority of WTO members are developing countries” and agreed to “place [developing 
countries’] needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this 
Declaration.”  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 
2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).  
2
 See generally, Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round 
Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 (2010) (analyzing the history of the Doha Round’s 
decade-long negotiation stalemate). 
3
 See e.g., Alan Beattie, Hopes Fade for Accord at Doha Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 22, 
2011 (highlighting fissures among the U.S., the EU, Brazil, and China on various issues, 
such as cotton subsidies); Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Contemplating Doha 
Failure, WTO Members Look to Paris Meeting for Way Forward, 15 BRIDGES WKLY. 
TRADE NEWS DIGEST, May 25, 2011, at 1,  
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perspective betrays a firm premise that the WTO is an instrument that 
coordinates and channels its (major) members’ positions, which are 
ultimately informed by their domestic politics.  That is, WTO members’ 
national interests determine what the WTO does, and perhaps more 
importantly what it is.  This perspective, which presupposes individualized, 
profit-maximizing states, is subject to a positivist methodology4: it explains 
why and how states behave in a particular situation.  This thread of thought, 
loosely coined “rationalism,”5 is a dominant paradigm among contemporary 
international relations (IR) scholars.6  Under a rationalist lens, the Doha 
Round is no more than a deal fallen apart.  
Rationalism certainly holds great explanatory power over state 
behaviors.  It would be disingenuous to say that states do not pursue 
material (economic) interests.  Still, however, rationalism does not, and 
cannot, elucidate how those WTO members form the titular “interests” in 
the first place, and equally importantly, how the WTO, qua organization, 
shapes such formation.  While states communicate with one another as 
social actors, rationalism simply brackets such ideational factors as ideas, 
values, norms,7 discourse,8 and learning, which do influence, and even 
                                                                                                                            
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly15-19.pdf (observing gaps in 
negotiating parties’ positions as “unbridgeable”); Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., 
Deeply Divided, WTO Members to Search for Common Ground on Doha, 14 BRIDGES 
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIGEST, May 26, 2010, at 1, 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly14-19.pdf (pointing out that WTO 
members failed to agree on “common terms of engagement”). 
4
 See Steven Smith, The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social 
Science?, 2 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 374, 375 (2000) (contending that positivism is so 
dominant as a methodology, in particular in the United States, that it tends to marginalize 
other epistemological approaches).  
5
 Two strands of IR theories stand out under the banner of rationalism depending on 
main parameters: realism (neo-realism) characterizes an IO as a mechanism reflecting 
interest of powerful states, while liberalism (neo-liberalism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism) focuses on the utilities that an IO offers to its members, such as the 
reduction of transaction costs.  See infra Part I.A–B. 
6
 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 
WORLD POL. 324, 324 (1998) (observing that the neorealist-neoliberal debate has been 
central within IR for the past decade). 
7
 Although scholars in a wide range of disciplines have used social norms as an 
analytical device, social norms can be defined as a set of criteria for “appropriate behavior 
for actors with a given identity” in understanding social construction.  Martha Finnemore & 
Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 
891 (1998); see also Matthew J. Hoffmann, Norms and Social Constructivism in 
International Relations, in 8 INT’L STUD. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert A. Denemark ed., 2010).  
Cf. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS xiii (1987) (arguing that “norms and 
behaviour should become more closely integrated in economic theory”). 
8
 In this article, the term “discourse” is used in a generic sense referring to an 
PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR 
4 Reconstructing World Politics [24-Feb-12 
 
determine, state behaviors.9  After all, the WTO membership cannot be 
reduced simply to a bargaining privilege; it also represents a common set of 
beliefs shared collectively by WTO members, with or without cost-benefit 
calculations.10  From this perspective, one might render a different 
explanation for the Doha failure.  The true failure of the WTO members 
might be the failure to establish a shared normative ground among 
themselves over the cause of development that the Doha Round was 
supposed to espouse (“Doha Development Agenda”).11  Major WTO 
members never factored development into their interest matrices through 
adequate discursive interactions.  Development never morphed into the 
WTO’s social structure based on which WTO members self-evaluate their 
particular behaviors as appropriate or not.12  Under this framework, the 
Doha Round is a failed community-building project.  
These two distinct frameworks—rationalist and sociological—can 
apply in general to other international organizations (IOs).  Under a 
rationalist framework, an IO is merely a tool that states create to maximize 
their material interests.  With the ex ante institutional choice and design, 
states pre-program an IO to facilitate interstate cooperation to reduce 
transaction costs and stabilize expectations.  However, rationalism does not 
exhaust perspectives on IOs.  In an alternative view, an IO may be defined 
as a community that emerges, rather than being created by its members, 
based on the aforementioned socio-cognitive properties. 13  This Article 
aims to animate the latter—“sociological”—framework that remains 
hitherto under-explored in international studies.14  Importantly, the starkly 
                                                                                                                            
“interactive process by which ideas are conveyed” without any “post-modern baggage.”  
Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303, 305 (2008). 
9
 Regarding this line of thought (“constructivism”), see infra Part II.B. 
10
 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
324, 338 (2006) (observing that “the ideas, shared understandings, and norms (soft and 
hard) that emerge from participation in IOs [International Organizations] ‘constrain and 
enable choices’ for states”). 
11
 Cho, supra note 2, at Part III. 
12
 Regarding the “logic of appropriateness,” see infra note 185.  
13
 See Two Approaches, infra note 14, at 389 (observing that “institutions are often not 
created consciously by human beings but rather emerge slowly through a less deliberative 
process”). 
14
 One of the earlier ventures to apply sociology to international law can be found in 
Max Huber’s work.  While emphasizing collective interests among states, Huber still 
recognized a special status of powerful states (“Machtrecht”), especially in his early work.  
See Jost Delbrück, Max Huber’s Sociological Approach to International Law Revisited, 18 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 97, 97–98, 109–11 (2007).  Subsequently, Harold Lasswell and Myres 
McDougal also pursued “the global common interest in approximating a world public order 
of human dignity.” Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International 
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different prescriptions that these two frameworks generate over a failure of 
interstate cooperation justify the urgent need for the alternative approach.  
Those who advocate rationalism would propose to refurbish the machinery 
of bargaining, while those who adopt the sociological framework might be 
more interested in community-building agendas.   
The baseline of this Article is that we are accustomed to perceiving 
an IO through its creators, i.e., sovereign states.  The conventional 
paradigm of an IO may be best depicted as a global “Gesellschaft,”15 a 
contractual relationship that sovereign states establish to achieve a certain 
functional (regulatory) goal, be it the promotion of free trade or the 
prevention of climate change.16  Here, particular political outcomes may be 
attributed eventually to calculative individual actions and interactions, 
rather than to endogenous norms provided by an IO itself.17  To this extent, 
an IO may be viewed as an “empty shell” that states manipulate to attain 
their desired goals.18  Methodologically, rationalism’s characteristic 
                                                                                                                            
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 76–77 (2006).  Yet this sociological approach has often been 
criticized as lacking interest in the “effectiveness” of international law.  Id.  More recently, 
international scholars, in particular those who take international organizations seriously, 
have begun to pay more attention to a sociological framework in understanding state 
behaviors.  For example, José Alvarez viewed compliance pull as a sociological 
phenomenon.  Alvarez, supra note 10.  In a similar vein, Jutta Brunnée submitted that IOs 
“socialize[]” states and lead them to internalize norms generated within IOs even without 
material (cost-benefit) considerations.  Id. (referring to the reliance on the concept of 
socialization based on IO membership by Jutta Brunnée and other scholars).  Robert 
Keohane called a sociological approach a “reflexive” approach in contrast with a rationalist 
approach, yet he criticized that a sociological approach generally lacks a coherent “theory.”  
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions:  Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379, 
381, 393 (1988) [hereinafter Two Approaches]. 
15
 See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 223–31 (GEMEINSCHAFT UND 
GESELLSCHAFT) (Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., 1957), reprinted in MARCELLO TRUZZI, 
SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS 145–54 (1971) [hereinafter The Classic 
Statements].  Tönnies wrote about the dichotomy between Gesellschaft (“society”) and 
Gemeinschaft (“community”) found in human interactions and group dynamics.  Tönnies 
defined Gesellschaft as an artificial human connection built by people who possessed an 
intent to work together, whereas Gemeinschaft was a natural human connection arising out 
of birth or family.  Id.    
16
 Cf. FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 52 (1881) (viewing that 
“economical calculus” in opposition to ethical deliberation was particularly relevant to 
“war and contract”). 
17
 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736–39 (1984) (observing that 
utilitarianism as an ideology interprets actions as based on calculated decisions). 
18
 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons From the Rational 
Choice Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 133 (1989). 
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Epicurean propensity for parsimony (“the propensity to account for all 
appearances from as few principles as possible”)19 does not address 
“accounts based on post hoc observation of values or ideology.”20  In other 
words, it “limit[s] the number of variables that a theory considers,” which  
“can increase both its explanatory content and its capacity to concentrate the 
scholarly mind.”21  Therefore, a “technical analysis of a very high order”22 
may produce many useful research projects, which not only offer 
convincing narratives on an IO’s present operation but also hold a 
prognostic force on its evolution. 
Useful as it may be, rationalism is nonetheless prone to paradigmatic 
blind spots, presenting a largely curtailed picture of contemporary IOs and 
their relationships with states.  Most of all, rationalism’s very assumption 
does not envision cognitive-normative properties of state action.23  Yet, 
states’ strategic (rational) choices, which are informed by their (rationally 
structured) national interests, cannot be made in a vacuum.  States are not 
just “calculating automatons”24; they also may be “interpretive.”25  Their 
alleged rational choices are not to be merely deducted from the “tightly 
defined, pre-packed sets of motives.”26  There must be an explicit 
explanation as to how these interests (preferences) are formed,27 such as 
through “frames of reference, moral templates and normative 
orientations.”28  States, as well as their actions, are in fact deeply 
“embedded” in their socio-cultural settings, which are beyond their control, 
such that a purely utilitarian (profit-maximizing) paradigm becomes 
nonsensical.29   
The ever-intensifying interdependency fueled by both the yin and 
                                                 
19
 SEN, supra note 7, at 24. 
20
 Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 392. 
21
 Id. 
22
 SEN, supra note 7, at 8. 
23
 Id. at 15. 
24
 Colin Hay & Daniel Wincott, Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism, 46 
POL. STUD. 951, 952 (1998). 
25
 Stephen Bell, Institutionalism: Old and New, in GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, POLICY 
AND POWER IN AUSTRALIA 1, 8 (Dennis Woodward, Andrew Parkin & John Summers eds., 
2002). 
26
 Id. 
27
 Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 1, 8 (Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo eds., 1992). 
28
 Bell, supra note 25; see also THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
29
 This theoretical position is called “historical institutionalism.” See Thomas A. 
Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231, 
237 (1995) (book review). 
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yang of globalization also warrants a sociological framework in that it 
offers a compelling analytical framework under which one can 
systematically reconstruct our conventional way of understanding of an IO.  
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent “postnational constellation”30 
instilled a strong sense of collectivity (“mentalités collectives”)31 in the 
Hobbesian international sphere.32  Here, the sociological approach defines 
states as social actors, rather than atomistic individuals.33  The internal 
dynamics among social actors both condition and constitute their own 
perception of challenges and responses, which conventional IR theorists 
tend to discount.34  Therefore, the sociological paradigm is capable of 
probing those issues that rationalism removes from the research agenda 
under its own assumptions.35  In particular, this Article employs an IR 
version of a sociological framework, i.e., “constructivism.”36  While 
                                                 
30
 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 176 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2006) 
[hereinafter DIVIDED WEST] (“In spatial, social, and material respects, nation-states 
encumber each other with the external effects of decisions that impinge on third parties 
who had no say in the decision-making process.  Hence, states cannot escape the need for 
regulation and coordination in the expanding horizon of a world society that is increasingly 
self-programming, even at the cultural level.”). 
31
 John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993) [hereinafter Territoriality]. 
32
 See Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 27. 
33
 Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations, 41 
INT’L ORG. 335, 366 (1987) (arguing for a theory that posits the state as a particular kind of 
social actor that is “an inherently social entity, rather than as a Hobbesian primitive 
individual”). 
34
 Id. 
35
 Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s 
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 337 (1996) (book review) (observing that realism and 
neoliberalism treat certain questions as assumptions and remove them from the research 
agenda whereas institutionalism’s framework allows questions about issues such as the 
origin and nature of states). 
36
 The pedigree of constructivism dates back to the 1950s when Karl Deutsch 
“highlighted the importance of identity formation measured by social transactions and 
communications.” Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and 
Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COL. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 26 (2000) (quoting Peter J. Katzenstein et al., International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645, 654 (1998)).  See 
generally KARL W. DEUTSCH ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
AREA: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (1957).  
Yet the term (“constructivism”) was coined by Nicholas Onuf in 1989.  See Brunnée & 
Toope, supra note 36 (citing NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING: 
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY ch. 1 (1989)).  There are many different forms of 
constructivism.  In this article, I draw mainly on a modest (thin) form of constructivism 
that Alexander Wendt developed along the line of “structurationist and symbolic 
interactionist sociology.”  ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
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admitting that power and interest still matter in terms of their causal 
(determinative) effect on state behaviors, constructivism nonetheless 
emphasizes the constitutive role of ideas and norms on such materialistic 
factors as power and interest.37  In other words, “power and interest 
explanations presuppose ideas.”38  Therefore, constructivists focus on 
certain “discursive conditions,” which may justify a rationalist 
explanation.39   
Constructivism enables us to conceptualize an “imagined 
community” that exists in a cognitive dimension comprised of norms and 
legal discourses.40  Under this constructivist Weltanschauung, an IO’s 
norms function as a language by which members of the IO communicate 
among one another, thereby understanding and predicting each others’ 
behaviors, instead of simply attempting to outmaneuver their fellow 
members.  Through norms qua medium (language), participants’ 
communicative competence transforms into administrative power that can 
effectively coordinate their behaviors.41  In this community (Gemeinschaft) 
conceptualized within an IO, one can envision the “enlarged mentalities” 
under which we can “compare[] our judgment with the possible rather than 
the actual judgments of others” and “put[] ourselves in the place of any 
other man.”42   
Suppose that an IO member claims that its measure is consistent 
with IO norms.  The eventual reception of this member’s validity claim by 
others—the legal interpretation—hinges on the “context-dependent 
acceptability of reasons.”43  That is to say, the member’s claim originates 
from its own perspective, which may be sustained unless challenged by 
another member.  Another member may attempt to invalidate the measure at 
issue by exposing it to “better reasons and context-altering learning 
                                                                                                                            
POLITICS 1 (1999).  See also Stefano Guzzini, A Reconstruction of Constructivism in 
International Relations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 147, 148 (observing that constructivism is 
inherently eclectic).  
37
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 135 (arguing that power and interest are still important but 
constituted more by ideas and emphasizing the constitutive, not causal, nature of ideas). 
38
 Id. (emphasis original). 
39
 Id. 
40
 Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 3 
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 319, 327 (1997); see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED 
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2d ed., 1991). 
41
 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 150 (William Rehg trans., 1992) 
[hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]. 
42
 Id. at 148 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 40 (John Henry 
Bernard trans., 1951)). 
43
 Id. at 36. 
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processes.”44  Thus, norms channel social actors’ behaviors via the 
“reasoning process,” which is operated by discursive merits and 
generalizable rules.45 
Nonetheless, this Article neither denounces rationalism nor 
oversubscribes to constructivism.46  The presence of global norms does not 
automatically translate into an immediate revision of a state’s strategic 
balance sheet.  Political gravitational force is always at large.  The “political 
survival calculus” in the minds of domestic politicians bound by short-term 
election cycles may interfere with or delay certain socio-cognitive 
transformations within an IO.47  Ideas and discourse do not always 
guarantee institutional changes within an IO.  These cognitive factors might 
prove futile in the face of “crystallized ideas about rationalist interests.”48   
What this Article does argue is that the old politics driven by the old 
paradigm cannot prevent the new social reality around IOs from emerging.  
Many international regulatory challenges that the world faces today, 
ranging from global poverty to climate change, may require structural, 
systemic, and long-term solutions, which a conventional bargain model 
based on a routine power politics or strategic cost-benefit analysis alone 
cannot fully embrace on account of its inevitable paradigmatic limitations.  
Those challenges call for a soul-searching discourse and deliberation among 
members of an IO and their nationals on such issues as values, goals, and 
their collective identities that the IO represents.  Although constructivism 
should not simply bracket those “things out there,” such as military and 
economic power,49 it can certainly lay bare that even these material 
elements “take on significance as states develop shared expectations 
                                                 
44
 Id. 
45
 FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS 
OF PRACTICES AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC 
AFFAIRS 43 (1991) (arguing that rules and norm guide choices via deliberation and 
discourse on the merits and “cast in terms of universalizable rules”). 
46
 Of course, constructivism could, and should, not claim a disciplinary monopoly in 
understanding the WTO. “[N]o approach can sustain claims to monopoly in truth—even on 
useful insights.” John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?: Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 882 (1998) 
[hereinafter Neo-Utilitarianism]. 
47
 See AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
APARTHEID (1995). 
48
 Vivien A. Schmidt, Taking Ideas and Discourses Seriously: Explaining Change 
through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth “New Institutionalism,” 2 EUR. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1, 16 (2009). 
49
 See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 134 
(1999). 
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through interaction.”50  Insofar as the old paradigm is unbefitting for these 
kinds of ideational factors in addressing new realities in the international 
field, a new perspectival endeavor, such as one proposed in this Article, 
should complement the conventional approach.51  On balance, an IO’s true 
reality may best manifest as a double helix structure52 of the two paradigms, 
under which any single paradigm may not claim its disciplinary 
monopoly.53  As a construct, an IO’s community (Gemeinschaft) is not only 
a constraining environment to its members: it is also an “enabling” structure 
that generates and even facilitates their purposeful behaviors.54   
                                                 
50
 Id. at 128. 
51
 See Peter J. Katzenstein et al., International Organization and the Study of World 
Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. 
Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 53 
(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that a “cross-paradigmatic” discourse between 
rationalism and constructivism can lead to a better understanding of world politics).  
52
 I owe this insight to Professor Joseph Weiler.  See also Katzenstein et al., supra note 
51, at 682 (emphasizing the complementarity between rationalism and constructivism).  
53
 The “structuration” theory may help elucidate this mutually complementary nature 
of rationalism and constructivism.  See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS 
IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 69 
(1979).  The structuration theory objects to structural determinism and emphasizes an 
ontological role of human agency.  It “join[s] agents and structures in a ‘dialectical 
synthesis’ that overcomes the subordination of one to the other, which is characteristic of 
both individualism and structuralism.”  Wendt, supra note 33, at 356.  It also 
accommodates insights from historical institutionalism by arguing that “social structures 
are inseparable from spatial and temporal structures, and that time and space must therefore 
be incorporated directly and explicitly into theoretical and concrete social research.”  Id.  
Under the structuration theory, an IO as a social structure maintains the “duality” of 
structure.  IO members (actors) and the IO (structure) are “mutually constitutive yet 
ontologically distinct” entities by “giving agents and structures equal ontological status.” 
Id. at 338–39, 360.  They are “co-determined”: an IO is the result of its members’ intended 
actions and interactions, while these actions and interactions are at the same time mediated 
by the unique context of the IO’s community that is not necessarily reducible to its 
members.  Id. at 360.  For example, within the context of the European Union (EU), while 
members determine its original constitutional architecture (inter-governmentalism), the 
EU’s supranational governance takes over once it is created by members and subsequently 
shapes members’ culture and identities.  See notably JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER 
ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 30 (1999) (observing that the original decision-
making process had “strong supranational elements” and that the European Commission 
had “virtually exclusive proposal-making competence”). 
54
 The neorealist bias according to which norms are imposed as constraints on social 
actors fails to recognize norms’ “enabling” function.  While actors are subject to norms, 
actors’ practices alter the normative structures by which they “share meanings, 
communicate intentions, criticize claims and justify choices.”  Kratochwil, supra note 45, 
at 61.  On the other hand, many constructivist explanations might be also consistent with 
the conventional IR paradigms in terms of “chang[ing] the material incentive structure of 
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Against this background, this Article first spotlights the increasing 
unfitness of the conventional paradigm (Gesellschaft) in fully apprehending 
what is happening with IOs and then offers an alternative paradigm 
(Gemeinschaft) to gain a more complete understanding of them.  This 
paradigm shift from a bargaining model to a community model also 
connotes a deontological project that attempts to institute more duty-
sensitive pathways in an IO’s operational mechanism that used to be 
dominated largely by material incentives such as power and interests.  In a 
methodological sense, the Article’s empirical undertaking of the WTO 
tends to enrich constructivist legal scholarship by “specify[ing] when, under 
what conditions, and to what extent, state behavior is shaped by social 
structure.”55   
The Article unfolds in the following sequence.  Part I first delineates 
major properties of rationalism.  This Part observes that the conventional 
image of an IO is a contractual (treaty-borne) tool—a global Gesellschaft—
for sovereign states to achieve certain functional (regulatory) goals.  It then 
highlights how the conventional paradigm has increasingly become inapt in 
the face of the postnational constellation in which the Cold War focus of 
narrow national interests is rapidly losing ground, if not disappearing 
entirely.  Part II then turns to constructivism as a sociological attempt to 
reconstruct an IO from a functional tool (Gesellschaft) to a community of 
law (Gemeinschaft) where ideational factors, such as norms and culture, can 
bond members in a sociological sense.   
Part III offers a case study on the WTO and the new (constructivist) 
paradigm presented in this Article.  This Part first addresses the old 
paradigm’s analytical deficiency.  It underlines the altering environment 
around the WTO, such as the global supply chains, which has made the 
global Gesellschaft model increasingly incapable of accurately reflecting 
the WTO’s actual, not hypothetical, operation.  This Part also accuses the 
old paradigm of normative paucity (protectionism) that continues to 
undermine the global trading system.  Concomitantly, Part III critically 
observes that an increasing number of diverging domestic regulations, albeit 
legitimate (non-protectionist) ones, cannot simply be bargained away under 
the old paradigm.  It then proposes that the WTO’s community 
(Gemeinschaft) is a conscious undertaking to overcome the aforementioned 
descriptive and normative challenges.   
                                                                                                                            
their targets by raising the costs of existing practices.”  Brian C. Rathbun, Uncertain about 
Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International 
Relations Theory, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 533, 551 (2007) [hereinafter Uncertainty]. 
55
 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2003). 
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Finally, some cautionary notes are in order.  First of all, this Article 
does not claim that constructivism should evenly apply to all IOs.56  
Constructivism, in and of itself, is oriented to a “conditional, context-
specific” approach to investigating an IO.57  Thus, the Article duly 
acknowledges that the new paradigm may not explain what is happening in 
every single existing IO with the same level of contentment.  In this sense, 
the Article’s case study (WTO) might be vulnerable to the criticism of a 
selection bias.58  Nor should the new paradigm be unduly construed as a 
World Government or its equivalent along the lines of John Austin’s 
command theory.  Any international theory should always heed the fatal 
risk of a false constitutional (domestic) analogy.59  Critically, an IO’s 
community is not a logical evolution from a domestic constitution, but 
rather a noble systematization of international relations themselves.60 
 
 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM: A CONTRACT, TREATY AND 
GESELLSCHAFT  
 
A.  Realism (Neorealism)  
 
The end of the Second World War heralded an era of international 
organizations (IOs).  The unprecedented tragedy brought to nations a rare 
Kantian moment of collective enlightenment.61  Most of about two hundred 
international organizations now operating were established post-bellum.62  
                                                 
56
 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 20 (2008) (arguing that constructivism cannot serve as a “single framework” for 
the study of international law due to the lack of a “model”). 
57
 Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 379–80. 
58
 See George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) (arguing against inferences based on compliance 
rates of enacted treaties due to problems of selection bias). 
59
 Hedley Bull defined the “domestic analogy” as follows: “the conditions of an 
orderly social life … are the same among states as they are within them: they require that 
the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.” HEDLEY BULL, 
HEDLEY BULL ON INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 79 (Kai Alderson & Andrew Hurrell eds., 
2000). 
60
 DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 132 (arguing that international law and a domestic 
state constitution cannot be understood in the same terms because international law 
“presents an inverted image of the state and the constitution”). 
61
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 297–308 (describing the Kantian culture based on 
collective identity and “friendship”).  
62
 For a comprehensive history of international organizations, see BOB REINALDA, 
ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: FROM 1815 TO THE PRESENT 
DAY (2009). 
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Most conspicuously, the United Nations (UN) was created “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “to unite our strength 
to maintain international peace and security.”63  Many other IOs derived 
from the UN, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), whose goal is 
the “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.”64  On 
the economic side, the so-called Bretton Woods institutions—the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—were launched to rehabilitate the war-torn 
international financial, economic, and trade systems.65 
From a technical standpoint, those IOs are a product of “treaties,” 
such as the UN Charter, the WHO Constitution, and the IMF Articles of 
Agreement.  These treaties are multi-party contracts in which sovereign 
states (contracting parties) stipulate their rights and obligations in a 
collective attempt to achieve the putative various regulatory goals.  Those 
sovereign states negotiate terms of such contracts, draft, sign, and execute 
them.  In any private contract, contracting parties engage in various types of 
“bargains” among themselves over eventual terms of those treaties during 
the negotiation process.  Naturally, they vie to secure better terms than their 
fellow states.   
This contractual characterization of treaties and IOs, which is 
conventional under public international law,66 is susceptible to “realism”67 
                                                 
63
 U.N. Charter pmbl.  
64
 WHO Constitution, art.1. 
65
 See Reinalda, supra note 62. 
66
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Draft Articles of State Responsibility on 
the Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001). 
67
 Richard Steinberg and Jonathan Zasloff categorized realism into three groups 
roughly in accordance with its pedigree and theoretical development. Richard H. Steinberg 
& Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 73–76 
(2006).  First, the “traditional realism” represented by Hans Morgenthau in the 1940s 
viewed that international law was a “reflection of both the interests of powerful states and 
norms held in common across states.”  Id. at 73.  Many scholars considered Morgenthau’s 
emphasis on “power” as a positive (scientific) step in understanding international law since 
it duly recognized the Westphalian reality largely lost in the American legal discourse in 
the first half of the 20th century.  Id. at 73–74.  Yet some warned that such an approach 
might be “morally wrong” in that it would rationalize the hegemonic (domestic) interest in 
the name of international law.  Id. at 74; see, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic 
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001).  The traditional realism evolved on in the 
latter half of the 20th century and reached its climax in the 1970s and 1980s during the 
heyday of the Cold War.  Here, the “power” element became so dominant that the 
normative element still visible in Morgenthau’s classical realist theory evaporated.  
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in IR theories.  Realists basically regard an IO, despite its copious 
variations, as an instrument that serves states’ functional needs, such as the 
promotion of interstate cooperation and reductions in transaction costs in 
interstate relations.68  Under the realist logic, an IO is nothing but a global 
“Gesellschaft,” an artificial (“sterilized”) association that states establish for 
the purpose of facilitating certain pre-programmed regulatory goals.69  An 
                                                                                                                            
Steinberg & Zasloff, at 74.  Steinberg and Zasloff labeled this rather radical form of 
realism, strongly influenced by political science literature, as “structural realism,” which is 
synonymous with “neo-realism.” Structural realists employed a Hobbesian view of 
anarchic state system, a submissive role of international law which they argued was a mere 
“epiphenomenon of underlying power” or a “coincidence of state interests or coercion by 
powerful states.”  See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 
(1979); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–37, 118, 
225 (2005).  Interestingly, Steinberg and Zasloff observed that despite the “common 
misunderstanding,” few realists make such claims other than structural realists.  Steinberg 
& Zasloff, at 75.  Finally, Steinberg and Zasloff viewed that some realists acknowledge 
certain “consequential” effects of international law on state behaviors, such as a facilitative 
role of international law in interstate cooperation (“realist-institutionalist hybrid”).  Id.  
Nonetheless, even this eclectic position is not free from basic realist beliefs, such as the 
belief that international law facilitates interstate cooperation to the extent that such 
cooperation is useful to or favored by powerful states.  See Richard H. Steinberg, In the 
Shadow of Law or Power?: Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the 
WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).  
Therefore, it might be fair to say that most contemporary realists, both legal scholars and 
political scientists, are “structural realists” or “neo-realists” in essence because even their 
nuanced acknowledgement of institutional influence of international law (and international 
organizations) still refuses to endorse a genuine “endogenous” impact of international law 
to state behaviors.  See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs 
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 112 (2009) (equating “structural realism” to “neo-
realism” as a “recent incarnation” of the classical realism). One way or another, 
international law is still reduced to hegemonic interests of powerful states. 
68
 See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International 
Organizations as Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); Harold K. Jacobson et al., 
National Entanglements in International Government Organizations, 80 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 134, 141–59 (1986).  The most radical version of realism leads to a wholly dismissive 
claim that “international law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their 
interests.”  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 67, at 13.  According to this position, states 
comply with international law only when such compliance is in sync with their interests.  
Harlan Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work?: A Constructivist Expansion, 27 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 636, 637 (2009) (observing that rational choice (game theory) 
scholars view states as rational actors who condition their compliance with international 
law on their interests). 
69
 See The Classic Statements, supra note 15, at 223–31 (viewing that where contracts 
become the basis of a system, it is then formed by its interests). 
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IO as a global Gesellschaft basically represents an “economistic” model 
where states attempt to maximize their interests by using a rational 
instrument to attain certain goals.70   
While realism represents a rationalist understanding of an IO,71  the 
IO’s innate contractual origin, and in particular, reciprocal bargain, 
inevitably exposes the global Gesellschaft to power disparity among its 
members.  Powerful states tend to design IO norms (contracts) in a way that 
best serve their own preferences and interests.  Therefore, Gesellschaftian 
norms are exogenously imposed constraints under which states’ alleged 
rational behaviors are strategized.72  The realist paradigm dates back to the 
Cold War period when “high politics,” such as security issues, dominated 
both public policymaking and academic debates.73  The realist methodology 
had nearly become a “tacit ontology,” 74 as it had long been left 
unchallenged.   
This rather inorganic view of IOs is a logical corollary to the root 
thesis of realism, such as “theories about states”75 or “statist ontology.”76  
Under this paradigm, an IO could not claim its own “ontological 
independence”77 separate from states.  Even an IO’s “causal status,” under 
                                                 
70
 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); Powell & DiMaggio, supra 
note 28; Anna Grandori, Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency Constructs in the 
Economics and Sociology of International Organizations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES, 61–78 (Siegwart Lindenberg & Hein 
Schreuder eds., 1993). 
71
 Realism is rationalistic in that it is based on Herbert Simon’s “substantive” notion of 
rationality, which always generates an optimal behavior through objective calculations.  
See Two Approaches, supra note 14 (citing Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: 
The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 294 
(1985)).  Yet as Robert Keohane aptly observed, this substantive rationality is situation-
specific, depending on an initial analytical setting.  Thus, the realist mantra of “national 
interests,” which found its heyday in the Cold War era, tends to presuppose an ever-present 
Hobbesian zero-sum conflict. 
72
 Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance 
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 410–11 (1999) (observing that 
ideologies of rationality determine strategic responses to law). 
73
 Katzenstein et al., supra note 51, at 652; cf. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2006) [hereinafter 
Sovereignty] (characterizing the sovereignty-based old assumptions of public international 
law as “mantras”). 
74
 John Gerard Ruggie & Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Epistemology, Ontology, and the 
Study of International Regimes, in CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998); see also WENDT, supra note 36, at 35. 
75
 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 70, at 706. 
76
 Id. at 700. 
77
 Id. at 704. 
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which it may condition or structure state behaviors by controlling the 
information-decision flow among states, might not grant the IO autonomy.78  
According to the old paradigm, IOs “have no independent effect on state 
behavior”79 since every single output generated by an IO is made, after all, 
through and by states.  Therefore, the old paradigm basically views an IO as 
a passive instrument created by sovereign states for a specific function, such 
as the reduction of transaction costs.80  At the same time, the old paradigm 
betrays “reductionism” in that its focus on “intricacies of the interactions 
among the individual actors” tends to make any organizational autonomy at 
the collective level “certainly superfluous and probably deleterious.”81 
Realism, based on “overly simplistic behavioural assumptions,”82 
tends to bracket complex social interactions that lead to the formation of 
preferences.83  Since realists tend to address only “one dimension of a 
multidimensional reality,” it tends to “reif[y] contemporary political 
arrangements.”84  However, states, as well as their actions, are in fact deeply 
“embedded” in their socio-cultural setting beyond their control such that a 
purely utilitarian (profit-maximizing) paradigm becomes nonsensical.85  
Historical developments reflected in an IO’s institutional (normative) 
design shape states’ behaviors, which are “culturally and structurally thick, 
not just strategically lean.”86 
Interestingly, this historicity has deprived the old paradigm of its 
Zeitgeist status.  Recent changes in both economic and cultural dynamics on 
a global scale have provided strong propellants for a “gestalt shift” in how 
we perceive and comprehend IOs.87  Although the Cold War era had 
provided sovereigntists (realists) with a uniquely fertile ground to thrive, the 
global market integration in tandem with the demise of political ideologies 
have gravitated toward communitarian inter-dependence over sovereign in-
dependence.  For example, it was no coincidence that in its youth, the WTO 
                                                 
78
 Id. 
79
 John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L 
SECURITY 5, 7 (1995).  
80
 See Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 390. 
81
 March & Olsen, supra note 17, at 735–36. 
82
 STEPHEN R. BELL, AUSTRALIA’S MONEY MANDARINS: THE RESERVE BANK AND THE 
POLITICS OF MONEY (2004). 
83
 See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996). 
84
 Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 390–91. 
85
 See supra note 29. 
86
 See Ira Katznelson, The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical 
Institutionalism Make a Difference?, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 191 (1998). 
87
 DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 161 (viewing that a gestalt shift depends on the 
world society’s cultural and economic dynamics). 
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was in its ascendency when the old realist paradigm emphasizing the theme 
of power and security declined at the end of the Cold War.88  Thus, with the 
advent of the new millennium, the prominence of the old (obstructionist) 
absolute sovereignty,89 and its descriptive power, has begun to decline, if 
not disappear entirely.90  This “postnational constellation,”91 which is 
comprised of, inter alia, the end of the Cold War and the consequent 
vanishing of the old realist security threat, pushed forward a new pattern of 
thought, one that is “more ideational and holistic”92 than sovereignty-driven 
confrontationalism.  Under this new reality, while states still remain major 
authoritarian entities whose collective actions distribute public goods and 
manage global affairs, new transnational trends, such as global supply 
chains, tend to deprive states of their “structural primacy and autonomy as 
[] unitary actor[s] in the international system.”93 
As collective stakes in the global public sphere—ranging from 
international commerce to the war on terrorism—have grown, states’ 
perceptions toward IOs have begun to shift gradually from a functional tool 
(contract) under which states compete with each other to something in 
which they actually collaborate, partner, and participate (community).  This 
“mentalités collectives”94 tends to reconfigure the traditional Hobbesian 
existential premise of states, i.e., anarchy, into a civilized status of 
“membership” in an international community.95  In this situation, 
overemphasizing state interests tends to generate an “incomplete” 
understanding of IOs, which should be complemented by an alternative that 
recognizes the “power of ideas.”96  In this context, Professor Joseph Weiler 
                                                 
88
 Daniel Abebe, Future of the WTO (Daniel Abebe), THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/future-of-wto.html. 
89
 Cf. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995); SUSAN 
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 14 (1996) (observing that there have been significant changes in the 
international financial and political economies and noting that there has been a “diffusion 
of authority away from national governments”). 
90
 See WENDT, supra note 36, at 4. 
91
 DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30. 
92
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 4. 
93
 Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 
INT’L ORG. 595, 625 (1995). 
94
 Territoriality, supra note 31. 
95
 CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 89, at 27 (viewing that sovereignty has changed and 
no longer means states have the freedom to act independently in their self-interest, but act 
in membership in an international community).  
96
 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 347, 
378 (1998).  (Neo)liberalists have recently turned to “ideas” as “additional intervening 
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insightfully observes that: 
[T]he static nature of 20th Century hermeneutics has 
camouflaged the development and differentiation of the international 
legal system itself from an almost exclusively state-centric system 
concerned primarily with mediating conflicting national interests 
and ensuring mutual co-existence to a more complex system which 
displays now communitarian features and is concerned with 
common systemic values which at times may transcend or be 
different from the negotiated aggregate of national interests.97 
Another descriptive weakness of the old paradigm is its incapability 
of identifying an institutional change within an IO—how it develops and 
evolves internally over an extensive period of time.  Under realism, change 
is either simply “assumed away”98 or imposed externally upon an IO by 
states as a logical outcome of their altered interests and preferences.99  Here, 
change is no more than an exogenous re-creation by a state, not an 
endogenous institutional development.  In addition, “few have noted that 
organizations differ over time, or that they perform differently from one 
another, or that they achieve their ends with varying effectiveness or 
efficiency.”100  Therefore, the old paradigm encounters few needs to 
investigate a unique nature and property of any given IO.  
 Notably, certain normative deficiencies of the realist-Gesellschaftian 
paradigm accompany the aforementioned descriptive ones.  First of all, in 
the Gesellschaftian structure, as is often the case in a domestic contract 
situation, power determines the eventual terms of the contract.101  Naturally, 
                                                                                                                            
variable[s] between power/interest and outcomes.”  WENDT, supra note 36, at 19.  
Nonetheless, they still remain materialists in the sense that they do not accept the premise 
that those material variables (power/interest) are in fact “effects” of or constituted by ideas.  
Id. at 114, 378. 
97
 WEILER, supra note 53 (emphasis added); see also Andrew Emmerson, 
Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political Excuse?, 11 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 135, 150 (2008) (observing that the realist obsession with the status quo is 
unsuitable to the WTO’s integrationist aspirations).  
98
 Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections between Historical and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION 
BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & 
Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005). 
99
 Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 661 (2006).  Here, realists 
show strong resistance to change, at least until the tipping point of what Krasner called 
“punctuated equilibrium.”  Krasner, supra note 67; see also Bell, supra note 25, at 12. 
100
 Ness & Brechin, supra note 68, at 247. 
101
 See Ji Li, From “See You in Court!” to “See You in Geneva!”: An Empirical Study 
of the Role of Social Norms in International Trade Dispute Resolution, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 
485, 488 (2007) (observing that “realists predict that the WTO is nothing more than a 
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the innate power disparity in the Gesellschaftian anarchy may entail 
exploitation or other unjust outcomes.  For example, even if a small WTO 
member prevails over a big, powerful country (such as the U.S.) in a WTO 
litigation, the former’s victory may be in vain.  If the powerful country 
refuses to comply with the WTO tribunal’s decision, the ultimate retaliation 
by the small country, i.e., the suspension of a tariff concession, might not 
work simply due to the insurmountable gap in the economic size between 
the two countries.102  This frustrating prospect tends to deter small countries 
from filing complaints against powerful countries in the first place.103  In 
sum, paradoxically, the contractual nature of an IO is vulnerable to the very 
Hobbesian struggle that it is supposed to prevent. 
 This power disparity among IO parties is also prone to an 
“externalization” of domestic politics, in particular those of powerful 
nations, onto the global Gesellschaft.104  In this process, the desperate 
voices of powerless developing countries tend to be silenced.105  This 
marginalization of developing countries within IOs raises various 
developmental concerns.  Two interrelated, and disheartening, 
contemporary global trends—the widening global income gap106 and ever-
increasing abject poverty in the least-developed countries (LDCs)107—have 
                                                                                                                            
forum for power politics”) (emphasis added). 
102
 “Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which involves a 
developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it 
is not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension authorized by the (Dispute 
Settlement Understanding) for the full amount of the level of nullification and impairment 
estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all agreements mentioned above 
combined.  The present text of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an eventuality.”  
Decision by the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU, European Communities-Regime 
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 
2000), at ¶ 177 (emphasis added). 
103
 See Chad Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, 
Interested Parties and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 287–310 (2005).  See 
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importance of capacity constraints in preventing poor countries from suing rich countries in 
the WTO).  
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CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1994). 
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 See Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 492 (2004). 
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 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 7 
(2005); INCOME: Global Gap Rising, World Bank Study Shows, UN WIRE (Jan. 18, 2002). 
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Blocks Brown-led Drive for Increase in Aid, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 23, 2002, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,637808,00.html (last visited 
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currently eclipsed a triumphant halo of globalization.  As the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) glorifies the mainstream consensus on market 
opening and deregulation,108 the World Social Forum (WSF) accuses the 
North of enacting hypocritical economic policies and explores the 
possibility of “another world.”109  As discussed above, the realist-
Gesellschaftian paradigm is largely incapable of accommodating a genuine 
pro-development discourse within an IO, as its theoretical concerns remain 
preoccupied with an egocentric state pursuing myopic national interests.  
This development deficit that is destined to materialize under the global 
Gesellschaft even invites those criticisms along the lines of neo-
imperialism.  Some development scholars condemn the global Gesellschaft 
as an “emerging Global State”110 or a new version of “Empire” operated by 
a “global market and global circuits of production”111 without due 
consideration of the interests of those marginalized. 
 Conceivably, those in the old paradigm camp might point to the 
eventuality of “hegemonic unilateralism”112 or even certain merits of a 
“well-meaning hegemon,”113 a role allegedly shouldered by the U.S. during 
the Cold War era.  For example, Kenneth Chan’s empirical analysis 
illustrates the importance of “egalitarian” considerations in the outcome of 
the GATT Tokyo Round trade negotiation.114  Chan argues that during the 
Tokyo Round negotiation, which took place during the 1970s, the Swiss 
proposal highlighting equity and fairness in tariff reductions prevailed over 
the U.S.’ “efficiency” approach.115  Ethan Kapstein translated such 
prevalence of egalitarianism in the Tokyo Round as a small “price” paid by 
the U.S for having an open global economy.116  Considering the U.S.’ 
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hegemonic status in the middle of the Cold War, this observation sounds 
quite plausible.  Yet after the Cold War ended and the post-hegemonic era 
began, such strategic (hegemonic) egalitarianism declined in what Jagdish 
Bhagwati termed the “diminished giant syndrome.”117  Unilateralist and 
parochial trade politics have increasingly become a hallmark of U.S. trade 
policy since the end of the Cold War.118 
 In sum, the old—realist-Gesellschaftian—paradigm tends to 
generate certain descriptive discontents because its outmoded narratives 
cannot fully analyze how the altered environment around an IO impacts its 
structure in a manner driven by endogenous sociological dynamics within 
the IO via cognitive factors such as ideas, culture, and norms.  In addition, 
the old paradigm, and its Gesellschaftian logic, are prone to the normatively 
problematic consequences destined to entail from the inherent power 
disparity among parties in an IO’s operation. 
 
B.  Regime Theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism   
 
Many a scholar has attempted to overcome the aforementioned 
limits in the realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm by exploring an alternative 
one.  Some realists departed from their traditional assumptions and took an 
institutionalist turn.  In the 1970s, an intellectual thirst for a systematic 
explanation of global governance amid some uncharacteristic 
developments, such as the relative encroachment of the U.S. hegemony and 
the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
gravitated many scholars toward the “regime theory.”119  Regime theorists 
define regimes as “governing arrangements constructed by states to 
coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior 
in various issue areas.”120  Therefore, a regime may constrain and condition 
states’ behavior.  In this regard, one can identify a “trade” regime 
represented by the GATT/WTO and a “monetary” regime represented by 
the IMF.  
Yet the lingering deficiency in the regime theory is its failure to 
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close the discrepancy between its epistemology and ontology.121  By 
definition, regimes are based on certain epistemological traits, such as the 
convergence of expectations or intersubjectivity among their participants.  
Yet the realist-positivist pedigree in the regime theory tends to focus only 
on objective forces influencing state behaviors and therefore trivializes the 
subjective, and intersubjective, elements that produce meanings of their 
behaviors and eventually constitute their identities (ontology).122  Therefore, 
the role of norms is rather passive in the regime theory since the theory 
regards norms as mere external variables with which to “hypothesize” a 
certain incidence, such as a state behavior.123  Under this basically “causal” 
setting, one of the classical logics, modus tollens, tends to prevail.  In other 
words, “even a single counterfactual occurrence” may lead to the refutation 
of norms or their efficacy.124  For example, the IMF helps prevent its 
members from manipulating their foreign exchange rates for the purpose of 
obtaining undue trade advantage.  Here, a regime theorist may be tempted 
to equate an anecdote of currency manipulation with the normative 
bankruptcy of the IMF. 
Importantly, however, rather than directly “causing” a certain state 
behavior, norms may “guide,” “inspire,” or “justify” the behavior.125  While 
regime theorists are interested in whether an IO can effectively control its 
members’ behavior, they seldom pay attention to the importance of the 
“communicative dynamic” under which states justify their own behaviors as 
well as interpret and respond to others’ behaviors through norms.126  In the 
IMF example, regime theories would not focus on how other exporting 
countries potentially affected by such an alleged currency manipulation 
might demand reasons behind the measure from the devaluing country as 
well as how the devaluing country might respond to such a reason-giving 
request.  Regime theorists might not fully embrace the possibility of the 
devaluing country being persuaded and modifying its original measure as a 
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result of this communication in a manner consistent with IMF norms. 
Moreover, the regime theory, like realism, remains rationalistic in 
that the role of norms is still instrumental: norms exist in a regime to serve 
certain goals, such as reducing transaction costs.127  Yet such separation of 
means and ends appears to be at odds with the nature of law itself.  “In law 
when available means limit and in part define the goals, the means and the 
goal thus defined are to that extent inseparable.”128  On account of the 
aforementioned deficiencies, even in its heyday (1980s) regime theory 
literature failed to outshine that of general international relations.129  
Therefore, scholars sought another alternative framework to understand IOs 
against a broad backdrop of international relations.  Liberalism (neo-
liberalism)130 might present itself as such an alternative framework.  
Liberalism (neoliberalism) considers private individuals or their 
groups as primary actors in international relations.131  It views states as 
mere “surrogates” for individual or group preferences.132  These domestic 
constituencies express their values and interests through various domestic 
channels, such as legislation, political actions, court decisions, or self-
organizations.133  As rational actors, neoliberalism argues, those individuals 
“promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material 
scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.”134  
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Therefore, neoliberalism takes an integrated view of the relationship 
between the international and domestic spheres.135  For example, neoliberal 
scholars believe that an understanding of the workings of international 
tribunals requires knowledge of the internal operations of the state actors 
that establish such tribunals and decide which disputes to submit or not to 
submit.136 
The challenge that liberal theorists face in international relations is 
how to coordinate these different liberal preferences among states with 
minimum transaction costs.137  Liberal theorists view that a regime or an 
international organization provides such a coordination mechanism among 
states by creating norms, reducing transaction costs, and supplying 
information.  Accordingly, the stability of a regime indicates that 
conflicting domestic liberal preferences have been somehow coordinated.138  
For example, drawing largely on economics, such as game theory (the 
prisoner’s dilemma), Robert Keohane demonstrates that “institutions” 
matter since they can facilitate interstate cooperation by providing 
information, reducing transaction costs, and monitoring compliance.139  In a 
similar vein, Robert Axelrod observes that the prisoner’s dilemma could be 
avoided if games were repeated indefinitely, the monitoring costs were 
sufficiently low, and the actors’ discount rates (for the future) not too 
high.140  
Therefore, the neoliberal paradigm portrays an IO as a Lockean 
architecture that denotes a cooperative rivalry among members to attain 
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certain common regulatory goals.141  Neoliberalism is similar to the regime 
theory in that it highlights a regularized institutional mechanism with which 
to monitor and coordinate states’ behaviors.142  According to neoliberalism, 
such a coordinative mechanism is, as discussed above, largely a reflection 
of member states’ domestic preferences.  In other words, an IO’s members 
project their domestic norms and values to the IO system. 
Nonetheless, neoliberalism is also vulnerable to criticism, in 
particular as to its key assumptions.  One might argue that neoliberalism is a 
rather special theory that applies only to a special situation, i.e., such a time 
and space as meets “liberal” conditions.  When and where such conditions 
are met, neoliberalism may well describe why and how states cooperate and 
change their behaviors.  However, when and where such conditions are not 
met, which in fact appears to be a norm in the contemporary international 
environment, its theoretical persuasiveness and validity tend to be 
questioned.  
José Alvarez challenged a fundamental liberal assumption that 
liberal nations are more likely to cooperate among themselves than non-
liberal ones.  Not only did Alvarez question the artificial distinction 
between “liberal” and “non-liberal” states but also he pointed out the poor 
record of the U. S., a liberal state, in international cooperation and 
compliance.143  After all, according to one survey, 57 percent of WTO 
memberships by population belong to the titular “non-liberal” group.144  
Under this situation, over-projecting liberal political values embedded in 
some Western democracies onto the WTO domain may result in both 
descriptive and prescriptive conundrums.  
 
C.  The Rationalist Dilemma  
 
The aforementioned conventional IR theories, be it neorealism or 
neoliberalism, feature common properties as a form of rationalism.  Even 
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neoliberalism considers norms as a “superstructure built on a material 
base.”145  Neoliberal scholars view that IO norms simply constrain or 
“regulate” state behaviors in certain issue areas, rather than “constituting” 
states’ interests and identities.  They contend that those interests and 
identities are exogenously defined by liberal domestic politics rather than 
emerging endogenously within an IO. 
 Here, neoliberalism parallels neorealism in that material factors 
exogenously determine state behaviors and provide us with useful 
knowledge in understanding how international institutions work.146  
According to David Baldwin,147 the theoretical distinction between 
neorealists and neoliberals is far from being salient: any differences 
between them are of a matter of degree, not of substance.  For example, 
both neorealists and neoliberals recognize that anarchy constrains state 
behavior, while institutions (regimes) can mitigate such constraints.  (No 
wonder that the regime theory derives from neorealism, while neoliberal 
institutionalism derives from neoliberalism.)  What distinguishes neorealists 
from neoliberals is that the former are more cognizant of anarchy’s 
constraining power than the latter, while the latter are more optimistic on 
institutions’ cooperation-inducing power than the former.  Markedly, both 
theories view that states desire to maximize their material interests, while 
paying little attention to moral considerations.  In this vein, Robert Keohane 
grouped neorealism and neoliberalism together and labeled them as 
“rationalism” in that their common thesis is substantive rationality 
consisting of certain material utilities, such as power, interest, and 
efficiency.  The rationalist interpretation of an IO is as follows: Member 
states create and maintain an IO because it serves the interest of powerful 
members (neorealism) or to generate certain collective utilities, such as the 
reduction of transaction costs, among like-minded (liberal) members 
(neoliberalism).  
Naturally, rationalism connotes a strong microeconomic bias148 as it 
presupposes that international institutions are mediums that “rational, self-
interested actors” establish to “enhance efficiency in obtaining the actors’ 
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preferences.”149  Thus, mainstream international relations (IR) theories 
reveal their “enthusiasm for measurement”; in fact, both realism and 
liberalism widely adopt microeconomic methodologies that are highly 
susceptible to modeling and mathematical equations.150  In a similar vein, 
John Ruggie highlights the “utilitarian” framework adopted by rationalism.  
Ruggie critically observes that even rationalists consider ideational factors, 
but in terms of utilities in achieving agents’ material interests.151  For 
example, some scholars submit that rational actors may comply with 
international law out of a fear of “reputation” costs.152  At first glance, one 
might assume that a reputation seeker might easily internalize international 
norms for fear of loss to its reputation from non-compliance.  Yet it is still a 
derivative form of rationalism in that reputation itself is an exogenous factor 
shaping an actor’s rational pay-off matrices.  If the fear of such loss is 
somehow attenuated, as is often the case with superpowers like the U.S., it 
is only rational to expect relatively little compliance from the actor, if not 
always.153  More importantly, states may often comply with international 
law without any rational (cost-benefit) basis.154 
Although rationalism may be useful in understanding and predicting 
IO members’ behaviors within a given matrix of preferences, it nonetheless 
offers very few collective possibilities to “change” the existing system of 
fixed preferences.155  Consequently, rationalism largely “reproduce[s] the 
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status quo.”156  For this reason, the rationalist interpretation of an IO often 
lacks historical and cultural insights with which one may identify the 
transformation of the IO system on its own terms.  As a type of 
functionalism, rationalism tends to offer a “solution that is achieved 
relatively rapidly and is independent of the details of historical events 
leading to it.”157  It largely brackets the unique historical path of an 
organization and its often rich institutional legacies, such as norms and 
practices, thereby omitting the sociological reality of the organization.  
Thus, it cannot explain how an IO has developed its own unique 
institutional values and identity.  Nor can it fathom how its norms, which 
the system itself generates internally rather than accepting those imposed 
externally, engineer the institutional evolution.  For example, the rationalist 
diagnosis of the current stalemate of the Doha Development Round is either 
the lack of political input from powerful countries (neorealism) or the 
failure to coordinate  members’ domestic preferences (neoliberalism).  
Rationalism simply would not take into account the ideational cause 
(development) historically entrenched in the Doha Round. 
Finally, as rationalism basically presupposes states as asocial, 
atomistic, and “self-centered” entities,158 such an exclusivist dimension of 
sovereignty tends to foreclose many necessary inquiries.159  As long as 
sovereignty means “the ability to afford not to learn,”160 its mere invocation 
may shrink future institutional possibilities, including various institutional 
changes.161  Likewise, insofar as rationalism or Gesellschaftian theses 
regard an international institution only as the “object of strategic choice,” 
they fail to embrace the possibility that an IO may be a genuine—
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normative—constraint on actors’ behavior.162 
 
 
II. A NEW PARADIGM: AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AS A 
“COMMUNITY” 
 
A.  A Sociological Turn 
 
The cardinal contribution of rationalism originates from its 
characteristic parsimony enabled by its “thin” model of rationality defined 
by “fixed preferences” and “neutral institutional incentive structures.”163  
Based on such parsimony, rationalists can formulate mathematical game 
models with hypothetical (rational) actors.  Under rationalism, actors may 
be rational yet “in an unthinking manner.”164  Nonetheless, these rational 
actors are not necessarily real actors: they do not feature more complicated 
(social) dimensions of their behaviors driven by non-material, i.e., cognitive 
and ideational, factors such as ideas and beliefs.165  The rationalist 
framework does not embrace the notion of “sentient agents” that can change 
their institutions via “deliberation, contestation, as well as consensus-
building around ideas.”166   
At this juncture, it is vital to appreciate that these paradigmatic 
shortcomings of rationalism derive not from its inherent flaws in the 
theoretical design but from a largely inevitable epistemological 
distinction.167  Rationalism basically denotes a “structural theory” in that its 
main concern is to explain certain causal relations between the conditions of 
action and action itself.168  Therefore, rationalism views that a state 
behavior can be understood by, and attributable to, power (realism) or 
domestic preferences (liberalism).  In other words, according to a structural 
theory given, exogenous conditions (structure) constitute “various modes of 
                                                 
162
 Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of 
International Institutions, 52 INT’L ORG. 729, 729 (1998) (arguing that institutions matter 
as constraints that shape actors’ behavior in world politics). 
163
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 5. 
164
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 13. 
165
 See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 5; BO ROTHSTEIN, SOCIAL TRAPS AND THE PROBLEM 
OF TRUST ch. 1 (2005); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY: ACTOR-
CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH (1997). 
166
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 9. 
167
 See David Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?, 43 INT’L ORG. 
441, 448 (1989) (observing that an epistemological distinction between systemic and 
reductionist theories corresponds with the ontological distinction between the arrangement 
or structure of units  in the international system and their interaction). 
168
 Id. at 444, 461. 
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enablement and constraint” to state actions.169  Another epistemological 
characteristic of structural theory is “reductionism.”170  Here, Kenneth 
Waltz offered a classical definition of a structure.  According to Waltz, a 
structure refers to a “spontaneously generated, and unintended” 
arrangement that is generated by individual units differentiated by their 
properties or elements of domestic origin.171  In this structure, domestic 
politics eventually externalize international outcomes.172 
Such paradigmatic limitedness compels us to search for a novel 
paradigm that departs from the aforementioned etymological assumptions 
and instead embraces a “systems-level theory” that is capable of explaining 
how the organization of units, rather than individual units themselves, 
shapes their behaviors.173  The new paradigm should overcome the over-
determinacy of rationalism (structuralism) driven from an individuated 
agency (state) structure defined by material factors, such as power, interests, 
and utilities.  Although these conventional IR theories hold analytical 
prowess due to parsimony, they are nonetheless oblivious to certain 
sociological phenomena, such as “intentional rule structures”174 that social 
dynamics among agencies (states) create.  Critically, it is not a mere 
aggregate, or interrelationship, of states, but rather their corporate existence 
or collectivity (community) that endogenously constructs those states’ 
perception of values, norms, and even their collective identities.175 
While IR scholars have more recently begun to pay belated attention 
to various social aspects of political life, their investigations have largely 
failed to overcome the chronic “disciplinary isolation.”176  As IR scholars 
face ever-mounting theoretical needs to reflect social constructions into 
their own research programs, sociology offers a uniquely powerful set of 
narratives on the role of culture and norms in international life that could 
not be found in conventional IR theories such as realism and liberalism.177  
                                                 
169
 Id. 
170
 Id. at 448. 
171
 WALTZ, supra note 67, at 18, 39–40, 60, 91. 
172
 Id. at 39, 60; see Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade 
Liberalization, Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 219, 247 (2000) 
(observing that a trade policy depends on the domestic power balance between pro-trade 
and anti-trade groups). 
173
 Dessler, supra note 167, at 448. 
174
 Id. at 462. 
175
 Guy E. Swanson, An Organizational Analysis of Collectivities, 36 AM. SOC. REV. 
607 (1971) (arguing that collectivities can be classified according to their organization’s 
fundamentals for making decisions and taking action). 
176
 Finnemore, supra note 35, at 325. 
177
 Id.  Notably, “sophisticated” versions of liberalism appear to converge with 
constructivism. See Nye, supra note 142, at 238.  Joseph Nye coined this strand of 
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In particular, while conventional IR scholars (realists and liberals) tend to 
abstract from historical changes universal principles that can apply 
irrespective of time and space, a sociological paradigm “endogenizes” these 
changes.178  In other words, it seeks to explore the very dynamics of these 
changes themselves.  In this regard, Martha Finnemore’s apt observation 
merits a full reference:  
Sociology’s institutionalism is thus radically different from 
realism or liberalism in IR in that it falls on the structural or holist 
side of the agent-structure debate.  Analytically, social structure is 
ontologically prior to and generative of agents.  It creates actors; it 
is not created by them.  In contrast, most arguments in IR and 
political science begin with agents.  They take as given some set of 
actors having a similarly pre-specified set of interests-states 
pursuing wealth or security, members of Congress pursuing 
reelection, firms pursuing profits, national leaders pursuing a place 
in history.  Macro-level social structure is explained as the 
consequence of their interaction.  Even in approaches that IR calls 
“structural,” like Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism, the 
international structure is an epiphenomenon of the power 
capabilities of and interaction among individual actors; it has no 
independent ontological status.  It constrains only; it is not 
generative.179 
Against this background, political scientists have recently presented 
various strands of institutionalism (“new institutionalism”) based on 
different logics from rationalism.  While rationalism (or rationalist 
institutionalism) represents a “logic of calculation,”180 “historical 
                                                                                                                            
liberalism as “sociological Liberalism,” which highlights the “transformative effect of 
transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests.”  Id. 
at 246.  The realist paradigm, which tends to reduce all “unexplained variance” to the unit 
(state) level, cannot adequately theorize “nonstructural determinants” of state action, such 
as the communicative ability, technological advancement, and international norms, which 
go beyond the distribution of power among states. Id. at 250.  In other words, neorealism 
cannot fully explain the fact that the information technology and other logistical 
revolutions may profit non-state actors and incentivize states to further open their markets 
with no major changes in the international power distribution.  Id.  In contrast, liberalism—
at least some of its strands, such as sociological liberalism discussed above—pays more 
attention to “non-power incentives and variations in the capacity to communicate and 
cooperate.”  Id.  
178
 Finnemore, supra note 35, at 327–28. 
179
 Id. at 333 (emphasis added). 
180
 Vivien Schmidt observes that in exceptional cases some rationalist scholars, such as 
Judith Goldstein, do turn to the notion of ideas when they fail to explain institutional 
change through interests only.  For example, those scholars seem to view that ideas can 
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institutionalism” and “sociological institutionalism” connote the “logic of 
path-dependence” and the “logic of appropriateness,” respectively.181  First 
of all, historical institutionalism focuses on a historical path-dependency of 
an organization in its creation and evolution of an integrated system.182  
While still recognizing a strategic (calculative) dimension of individual 
actors’ dynamics in an organization, historical institutionalism also 
highlights the “cultural” properties that an organization provides, such as 
“moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action.”183  It provides 
“background information” as to how social actors as “sentient agents” instill 
past practices (and norms) with contextualized meanings, generate 
knowledge, and respond to external challenges.184 
In a similar fashion, sociological institutionalism highlights how 
broadly defined institutions, such as norms, shape behaviors of states by 
providing them with the “cognitive scripts, categories and models” that are 
vital for those behaviors.185  According to sociological institutionalism, an 
organization’s creation and evolution depends on social legitimacy, which it 
generates in a certain cultural setting, rather than on a narrow utilitarian 
premise.186  Thus, sociological institutionalism highlights the logic of 
“appropriateness” based on the culture and values (“how reality is 
structured”)187 in contrast with the logic of calculation or preferences 
                                                                                                                            
determine interests by clarifying goals in advance.  Yet, they still fail to demonstrate why 
some ideas are chosen over others.  See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 4; see also JUDITH 
GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1993). 
181
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 1 (arguing that that historical institutionalism 
concentrates on political institutions and their development through “regularized patterns 
and routinized practices” subject to a “logic of path-dependence” and that sociological 
institutionalism focuses on social agents who act based on a “logic of appropriateness”). 
182
 Nichols, supra note 149, at 475–82 (submitting that historical institutionalism’s 
definitive characteristic is its attenuated path dependency, which places an emphasis on the 
historical path taken by an institution in its creation and development). 
183
 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 939. 
184
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 9 (viewing that the background information offered by a 
historical institutionalist examination can illustrate how sentient actors instill rules with 
contextualized meanings, construct understandings, or create ideas that “lead  to the 
‘layering’ of one institution over another, the ‘reinterpretation’ of an institution, or the 
‘conversion’ of agents to another institution”). 
185
 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 948. “Sociological institutionalism (SI) 
focuses on the forms and procedures of organizational life stemming from culturally 
specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and 
meaning systems that guide human action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness.’” 
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 10; see also W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS (1995); Powell & DiMaggio, supra note 28; JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN 
P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATION BASIS OF POLITICS (1989). 
186
 See Nichols, supra note 149, at 485; Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 949. 
187
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 143. 
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adopted by the law and economics approach.188  Yet some scholars who 
pursue non-rationalist logics focus particularly on the “discursive” 
dimension, such as ideas and discourse, and are often collectively dubbed 
the “discursive institutionalism.”189  Among these scholars, some spotlight 
the “ideas” side (e.g., “ideational turn,”190 “ideational institutionalism,”191 
and “constructivist institutionalism”192); others emphasize the “discourse” 
side (e.g., “discourse analysis”193 and “réferentiel” (frame of reference”194).  
 
B.  Constructivism  
 
Premised on the aforementioned cognitive-sociological pedigree, 
“constructivism”195 in the IR theory circle provides us with an insightful 
paradigm.  Constructivism emerged in the late 1980s as an “ideational 
turn,”196 which aimed to counter materialistic theories such as neorealism 
and neoliberalism.197  This new “style of reasoning”198 is a “move from the 
                                                 
188
 See Nichols, supra note 149, at 498.  “[E]ven though an individual may be acting 
rationally or out of self interest, perceptions of rationality or self interest are framed 
through—and thus shaped by—institutions.”  Id. at 485; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death 
of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1986). 
189
 Schmidt, supra note 48, at 1–2; see also John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen, 
Introduction, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 9–13 
(John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001) (discussing discursive institutionalism). 
190
 See MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002) (discussing ideational 
developments and transformations in institutional change). 
191
 See Colin Hay, The “Crisis” of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism in 
Britain: An Ideational Institutionalist Approach, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 193, 193–218 (John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001). 
192
 See generally Colin Hay, Constructivist Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 56, 64–65 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing 
constructive institutionalism). 
193
 See Martin Hajer, A Frame in the Fields: Policymaking and the Reinvention of 
Politics, in DELIBERATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE 
NETWORK SOCIETY 88–112 (Maarten A. Hajer & Hendrik Wagenaar eds., 2003). 
194
 Bruno Jobert, The Normative Frameworks of Public Policy, 37 POL. STUD. 376, 
376-86 (1989).  
195
 See supra Part II.B. 
196
 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 7, at 888. 
197
 John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982) [hereinafter 
International Regimes] (observing that the prevailing interpretation of international 
authority, which focuses on power and a market rationality in international economic 
regimes, ignores phenomenological dimensions such as social purpose). 
198
 IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 160 (2004). 
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model of reality to the reality of the model.”199  In other words, the new 
Zeitgeist calls for an “ontology” (“what kind of things there are and how 
they are structured”) of an IO different from the old IR theories.200  In this 
regard, a mere equilibrium of competing political vectors cannot fully 
explain the existential foundation of an IO and its norms.201  While long-
term benefits to states are “heavily discounted” under the short-term 
election cycle in an average democratic system, the “value of obeying the 
law” still counteracts such myopic calculation.202  Kenneth Abbott observes 
that:  
Economic and political structures are not corporeal things; they 
owe their existence to constitutive ideas, constitutive in the sense of 
defining or creating a social institution ... that would otherwise not 
exist ... [This] is true of ... social constructs like ... international 
regimes .... As the underlying ideas change, the norms, rules and 
institutions that embody them, at all levels of political activity, 
evolve along with them.203 
Crucially, this new paradigm can explicate the nascent phenomenon 
of community within an IO.204  While still regarding “states” as the main 
units of analysis in explaining international relations, constructivism 
differentiates itself from the traditional IR theories in that it focuses on 
certain socio-cultural (“intersubjective”) dynamics among states in 
understanding states’ behaviors.  This is a “moment of perfect subjectivity” 
in the social process that the rationalist model has largely bracketed, as it 
naturalized its calculative methodology as ontology.205  Therefore, 
                                                 
199
 Vincent Pouliot, “Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology, 51 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 359, 363 (2007) (quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU, CHOSES DITES [THINGS SAID] 62  
(1987)). 
200
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 22, 370–71; see also MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA 
FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS 
6–7 (2004) (observing that an international organization can create its own “social reality” 
based on norms). 
201
 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law 
of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 501, 520 (1985). 
202
 Id. at 522. 
203
 Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving 
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996) (emphasis 
added). 
204
 This paper focuses on a “legal” or “normative” community. An international 
community, however, is not necessarily constituted by law alone.  See Bruno Simma & 
Andreas L. Paulus, The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of 
Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 266, 267 (1998) (warning against any wholesale adoption 
of “international legal community,” which views a community of states exclusively as a 
community of international law). 
205
 WENDT, supra note 36, at 367–68 (observing that rationalism “isolates an important 
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“endogenous” factors, such as ideas, values, and norms,206 are central 
parameters to constructivism vis-à-vis “exogenous” factors such as power, 
interest, or domestic politics.207 
These endogenous factors concern “not merely the instrumental 
rationality of the means actors select but also the normative self-
understanding of the ends held by the social groups in question.”208  
Therefore, constructivism can offer a richer, deeper, and perhaps better 
explanation than realism as to why states “hang together,” as Gerard Ruggie 
puts it, in particular through decades-long institutional changes, which are 
beyond the disciplinary assumptions of the old paradigm.209  The norm-
based intersubjectivity tends to overcome the realist failure to envision 
“critical self-reflection” which “gives us perspective on our social 
environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of determinism.”210  
This “collective reflexivity” offers an ideational foundation for a 
community within an IO as a “public sphere” which is an “emerging space 
where states appeal to public reason to hold each other accountable and 
manage their joint affairs.”211 
Constructivist understanding of an IO features the following basic 
characteristics: the emergence of cognitive rationality, the formation of 
social identities, and the redefinition of national interests. 
First, the emergence of “cognitive rationality,”212 which is enabled 
by a shared cultural-normative background within an IO, has naturally 
transformed the tone of organizational discourse from being power-oriented 
to being rule-oriented, and thus has paved the normative ground for an 
emerging community within an IO.213  This is a “norm-governed” 
                                                                                                                            
moment in the social process, a moment of perfect subjectivity when actors choose actions 
on the basis of identities and interests which are for an instant given”). 
206
 See Nichols, supra note 149, at 504; Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road 
from GATT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41–42 (1994) (documenting how 
Professor John Jackson’s study led to the creation of the WTO). 
207
 See supra Part I.A.  
208
 Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 860. See generally Max Weber, The Meaning 
of “Ethical Neutrality” in Sociology and Economics, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds., 1949). 
209
 A rationalist behavioral change is “exogenous” in that a state responds only to 
“changing prices in the environment.” WENDT, supra note 36, at 316. 
210
 Id. at 375. 
211
 Id. at 375–76. 
212
 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L. J. 273, 369 (1997) [hereinafter Supranational 
Adjudication]. 
213
 See Sovereignty, supra note 73.  In his celebrated “communicative action” theory, 
Jürgen Habermas argued that a communicative action necessitates a shared ground of both 
norms and facts among social actors.  See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION 
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change.214  In this sense, the biggest contribution of some IOs’ dispute 
resolution systems and its derivative jurisprudence may be that it promotes 
“fidelity to law,” rather than power, and unites state members around this 
ideal.215  It is under such fidelity to law that states may learn to lose under 
the dispute resolution mechanism based on their trust in the “law-
impregnated international community.”216  They cultivate an institutional 
confidence that they can prevail in the future, even though they lose today, 
as long as the community of law sustains.  In the absence of the fidelity to 
law, myopic parameters, such as political contingencies, would fill in any 
legal vacuum.217  Therefore, an essential element of community of law is 
the “self-awareness” by participants of the community of the “apolitical 
context” of their operation.218   
Second, in this new normatively conscious terrain, a collective 
                                                                                                                            
AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., 1993); 
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41; see also Emanuela Ceva & Andrea Fracasso, 
Seeking Mutual Understanding: A Discourse-Theoretical Analysis of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 457, 468 (2010) (arguing for a Habermasian 
discourse-theoretical interpretation of the WTO Dispute Settlement System).  
214
 International Regimes, supra note 197, at 404–05. 
215
 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Why Law – Efficiency, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW & 
PHIL. 259, 275–81 (1994).  “[T]he law of international trade requires that all of their 
matters be dealt with in terms of principles, rather than naked animosity and power. Thus 
international trade law encourages the continued communication essential for cooperation 
among trading nation governments.” Abbott, supra note 201, at 532; see also WTO Panel 
Report on United States-Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan. 
27, 2000), ¶ 7.76 (“The security and predictability in question are of “the multilateral 
trading system.” The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States 
but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security and 
predictability affects mostly these individual operators…”) (emphasis added).  
216
 Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective 
Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59 (Volker Rittberger ed., 
1995). 
217
 See generally Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as 
a Practical Discourse, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?: 
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 67–68 (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds., 
2006) [hereinafter A New Agenda] (warning that a lack of discourse based on legal 
principles creates a “fatal legal vacuum,” which tends to give rise to naked politics and 
peace-breaking economic balkanization). 
218
 Supranational Adjudication, supra note 212, at 369; see also Vagts, supra note 67, 
at 845 (observing that even a hegemon “has to operate in the highly legalized universe of 
the World Trade Organization”).  Regarding views that a legalized dispute settlement 
system tends to reduce the role of bargains based on power, see Robert Keohane, Andrew 
Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational,  54 INT’L ORG. 457 (2000).  But see MAJA ZEHFUSS, CONSTRUCTIVISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POLITICS OF REALITY 150 (2002) (emphasizing a 
political nature of intersubjectivity that reflects underlying power dynamics among states).  
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identity of states may be formulated against a social backdrop, rather than 
in an egocentric, atomistic, and rational player image.219  Here, a social 
identity may be defined as “sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself 
while taking the perspective of others.”220  Importantly, this 
intersubjectivity intermediated by ideas and norms is not reduced to an 
individual, psychological level221: it is “collective intentionality” based on 
social interactions.222  Based on social actors’ “ontological security,”223 this 
social identity shapes their behaviors under given situations and thus 
defines their collective interests.224  Therefore, under constructivism, how 
the material world is shaped depends on “dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world.”225  In other words, this social identity 
is an essential element of members’ “lifeworld,” which might be defined as 
the “storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens from which those 
participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of interpretation 
for use in their interpretive efforts.”226 
A logical corollary of these social, collective identities is a strong 
“empathy” among actors (states).  A leading constructivist theorist, 
Alexander Wendt, refers to this ethos as “positive identification with the 
welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the 
self, rather than independent.”227  That is to say actors build up not 
particularized but “diffuse” reciprocity, which tends to discourage 
uncooperative behaviors such as free-riding as well as assume costs even 
                                                 
219
 “The resolutely positivist (…) approach of international law (…) has been replaced by 
an objective conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect a 
collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of States organized as a 
community.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 270-271 (July 8) (Declaration of President Bedjaoui, at ¶ 13). 
220
 Id. 
221
 See Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An 
Analytical Framework, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE 3 (Judith Goldstein & Robert Keohane eds., 1993) (observing that 
ideas, as well as material interests, shape behavior and noting the impact of beliefs shared 
by large numbers of people, such as world views). 
222
 Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 869.  
223
 See Jennifer Mitzen, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 
Security Dilemma, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 341 (2006). 
224
 See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State; 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 385 (1994). 
225
 Adler, supra note 40, at 322. 
226
 Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the 
Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT’L ORG. 555, 564 (1997) (quoting JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 136 (1991)). 
227
 Wendt, supra note 224. 
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without “selective incentives.”228  Such observation is not merely utopian 
but empirically proven.229  Admittedly, the intersubjective qualities of social 
identities are not necessarily cooperative; they can be “conflictual,” as was 
seen in the Cold War.230  Nonetheless, this “intersubjective framework of 
meaning”231 structures the “internationalization of political authority,” 
whose elements include not only power but also legitimate “social 
purposes.”232  Importantly, it is norms that bring to terms these sociological 
behavioral patterns among actors.233  IO norms, such as institutional 
practices and jurisprudence,234 share similar operational patterns with a 
language in the sense that the structure of norms is basically self-referential.  
A state member’s behavior “can be corrected by an appeal to its own 
rules.”235  Moreover, these norms are “deeply embedded” and “taken for 
                                                 
228
 Id. at 386. 
229
 See Linnda R. Caporael et al., Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of 
Egoistic Incentives, 12 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 683 (1989); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical 
Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 1669 (1989). 
230
 Wendt, supra note 224, at 386.  In this sense, constructivist thinking has been 
around ever since Karl Deutsch envisioned “security communities” in which social 
interactions among members led to unique identity formation.  See Brunnee & Toope, 
supra note 36, at 26; Deutsch et al., supra note 36.  
231
 International Regimes, supra note 197, at 380. 
232
 Id. at 382.  Ruggie’s use of the term “social purpose” seems ambivalent.  On the 
one hand, it seems to signify a domestic social purpose (such as smooth adjustment), which 
inevitably compromises the goal of the multilateral trading system, i.e., free trade.  On the 
other hand, however, it also appears to indicate the GATT’s institutional purpose itself, 
which tends to construct its institutional identity and states’ interest. 
233
 According to Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, a strong sociological tradition, in 
particular Anthony Giddens’ “structuration theory,” shaped the development of 
constructivism.  Structurationists view that agents’ self-understandings of their behaviors 
are inseparably linked to social structures and that agents and social structures constitute 
each other via interaction. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 36, at 27; see also ANTHONY 
GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 
281–84 (1984).  Yet constructivists express a nuanced position in the causal relationship 
between these ideational factors and state behaviors.  They do not argue that shared 
understandings (norms) nurtured by social structures are a direct cause of state actions: 
rather, they observe that these social structures “constrain and enable” state actors in their 
behavioral choices.  Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 869. “[S]tates follow specific 
rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a longer-term interest in the maintenance 
of law-impregnated international community.”  Hurrell, supra note 216 (emphasis added).  
This position parallels with Anthony Giddens’ thesis of the “duality of structure.” 
GIDDENS, at 25–29. 
234
 See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS (2005) (arguing that the age of IOs has given rise to international norms, which 
alter the mechanisms behind the making, implementation, and enforcement of international 
law). 
235
 Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 384. 
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granted by participants as social facts that are not to be challenged.”236  In 
other words, state members “proceed on the performative assumption that 
speakers and hearers understand a grammatical expression in identical 
ways.”237 In this sense, norms can be viewed more as a “rhetorical and 
symbolic resource,” rather than as an “articulate mandate.”238  Therefore, 
the sociological role of norms does not necessarily translate into a Humean 
utility or a Hobbesian command.  Rather, as Émile Durkheim observed, 
norms prescribe a “claim to validity which is mediated by language and 
which can be validated discursively.”239 
Finally, the aforementioned cognitive-collective traits in 
constructivism spotlight how national interests are molded in a broader 
community of social actors (states) vis-à-vis the conventional IR theories 
that simply treat national interests as something cast from outside and 
fixed.240  These new possibilities connote the re-definition of the traditional 
national interests in much longer and broader terms than the old paradigm 
via a diffused notion of reciprocity.  In this regard, national interests might 
even signify systematic interests such as maintaining a stabilized, rule-
based system.241  According to this new paradigm, the yardstick for an IO’s 
success should be not only efficiency but also “appropriateness” reflecting 
certain socio-cultural considerations.242  As Martha Finnemore observed, 
organizations exist not solely because they are efficient but because as 
social goods they are perceived to be legitimate.243  Thus, the new theory 
also allows us to grapple with the “historical and cultural particularity” of 
an IO qua independent entity.244 
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 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41, at 11. 
238
 Edelman et al., supra note 72, at 406–407 (arguing that “the content and meaning of 
law is determined within the social field that it is designed to regulate”); see also Robin 
Stryker, Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for Social 
Conflict, Order, and Change, 99 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 847 (1994). 
239
 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 45, at 97. 
240
 International Regimes, supra note 197 at 384.  In fact, this socio-idealist approach 
is not new; it dates backs to postwar thinkers, such as Karl Deutch, Ernst Haas, and Hedley 
Bull, as well as to much earlier ones, such as Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant. See 
WENDT, supra note 36, at 3. 
241
 See Sovereignty, supra note 73, at 35–36 (criticizing a narrow version of self-
interest in international law based on rational choice theories). 
242
 See International Regimes, supra note 197, at 338; see also MARCH & OLSEN, 
supra note 185 (arguing that a logic of appropriateness is fundamental to political action 
and that legitimacy often depends on appropriateness). 
243
 Finnemore, supra note 35, at 329.  She also argues that this is the “entry point for 
culture” and that “the social values that support and legitimate some organizational forms 
and not others, some social activities and not others, are cultural values.” 
244
 Reus-Smit, supra note 226, at 585. 
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In sum, constructivism, as a new “generic orientation” or a new 
“research project,”245 is capable of offering a complementary narrative to 
pre-existing IR theories such as realism and liberalism.  Constructivism can 
demonstrate, via various empirical confirmations, its analytical capability 
over modern developments of IOs.246  In the next chapter, this Article 
applies constructivism in analyzing an institutional evolution of the 
GATT/WTO. 
 
 
III. APPLYING THE NEW PARADIGM: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS 
A WORLD TRADE COMMUNITY  
 
A.  The Origin and the Nature of the WTO’s Gesellschaft  
 
The archetype of the modern global trading system, i.e., the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was created against the backdrop 
of a Hobbesian battle among trading nations in the interwar period.  In a 
desperate attempt to escape the quagmires of the Great Depression at the 
expense of its trading partners, the U.S. under the Hoover administration 
commissioned one of the most egregious incarnations of protectionism in 
history, the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.247  This ill-conceived prescription 
evoked spontaneous retaliations from its trading partners.  This dismal 
phenomenon was quite a realist manifestation in that every country 
attempted to safeguard its own (myopic) national interest at the sacrifice of 
others.  At the same time, it demonstrated a Gesellschaftian symptom in that 
those trading nations had totally failed to take into account their collective 
interests, let alone those of others.  The consequent economic balkanization 
soon wreaked havoc on the global trading system, reducing the world trade 
volume by seventy percent and eventually contributing to the outbreak of 
the Second World War.248  
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 Susan K. Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: the Contest between 
Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 143, 145 
(2004) (quoting Mayer N. Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Cultural Framing, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 262 (1996) (defining a “frame” as 
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 Katzenstein et al., supra note 51 at 647–48 (viewing that research was generally 
more empirically oriented when analyzing social forces and political institutions). 
247
 See Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 179, 187 (1988) (observing that the failure of the Smoot-Hawley Act to deal with 
economic decline led to the delegitimization of protectionism and created a policymaking 
crisis). 
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This bitter experience brought to trading nations a rare Kantian 
moment of collective enlightenment.249  Bonding trading nations with a 
dense web of trade relations would be an effective way to prevent another 
tragic war.250  The GATT’s framers realized that they should promote open 
trade to achieve the Kantian aspiration of peace via collective prosperity,251 
i.e., “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand.”252  
This Kantian aspiration notwithstanding, the GATT framers had no 
option but to create a contract (Gesellschaftian), not a community 
(Gemeinschaftian), in its inception: there had been neither a strong ethos of 
community among trading nations nor an adequate legal infrastructure to 
buttress the original lofty cause.  Neither vibrant trade nor collective trust 
had existed among them.  Under these circumstances, the most important 
mission was to promptly resuscitate anemic international trade and staunch 
any further protectionism, i.e., the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade” and the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce.”253  
Against this background, the GATT had started as a conventional 
contractual entity that sovereign contracting parties established for the 
purpose of administering trade liberalization, in particular tariff reduction, 
and monitoring any cheating (protectionism) among contracting parties.  
The gist of this contract was to conduct reciprocal tariff reduction bargains 
and preserve their outcomes (tariff concessions) via legally binding 
obligations.  The GATT contract condemned and remedied any cheating 
that would counterbalance the delicate balance of concessions attained by 
previous tariff-cutting negotiations.  As a contract, the GATT, and now the 
WTO that inherited the GATT’s contractual legacy, naturally preserves the 
                                                                                                                            
Lessons from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 
2003) (quoting remarks by the former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on 
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 See supra note 61.  
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 IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHIC ESSAY 33 (Benjamin F. 
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sanctity of “bargains” based on the quid pro quo principle.254  
Thus, the GATT’s original function was to cut tariffs, as was seen in 
its very appellation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  Beware 
that the word “Tariffs” comes before “Trade.”  Cutting tariffs was the 
quintessential material goal of a grand contract titled GATT: material, 
tangible term “Tariffs” were prioritized over cognitive, intangible term 
“Trade.”  Tariff reduction is mainly a “bilateral” negotiation process,255 
which is run by a reciprocal bargain and culminates in a balance of mutual 
concessions, although benefits of these bilateral bargains are eventually 
multilateralized.  Under this quid pro quo structure, power and interest are 
the main currencies and languages of discourse; there is little room for 
cognitive factors such as norms and values.  Note that trade rules, such as 
the National Treatment principle, were originally designed to play only a 
secondary role of preserving the original balance of reciprocal concessions 
in trade negotiations, not for the sake of rule of law in trade relations 
itself.256 
An earlier pattern of GATT jurisprudence attests to this contractual 
aspect.  For example, the remedial prototype of the GATT was 
“nullification or impairment,”257 which is equivalent to injuries or damages 
in the domestic law of contract.  Once a contracting party inflicted any 
commercial loss (nullification or impairment) on another contracting party, 
the former was deemed to have undermined the subtle material balance of 
concessions made in the previous negotiation and thus liable to the latter,258 
regardless of whether the measure at issue conflicted with GATT 
provisions.259  Therefore, early GATT panels often explored whether and 
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 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 763, 766–67 (2004) (observing that GATT was mainly a reciprocal tariff 
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how much a defendant’s measure caused actual adverse commercial effects, 
such as the loss of exports, to the complainant.260 
 
B.  The WTO’s Gesellschaftian Legacy and Its Descriptive Discontent 
 
Like any other social construct, the old paradigm (realism-global 
Gesellschaft), discussed above reflects a particular social context of its time.  
Such context may be both ideological and material (economic).  
Importantly, as its original underlying social context changes, the old 
paradigm tends to lose its original traction as an analytical tool.  In addition 
to these external contextual changes, the unprecedented institutional-
sociological evolution within the GATT/WTO over the last six decades has 
transformed its internal dynamics, which is characterized by its unique 
norms and culture in a manner unfathomable under the old paradigm.  
First, from an ideological standpoint, the old GATT had operated 
under the dominant milieu of the East-West conflict.  The GATT largely 
excluded the former Soviet bloc as well as Communist China during the 
Cold War era.  This exclusion might have disqualified the GATT as a 
genuine “global” trading system.  Yet the sudden dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc and the rise of China as a major trading power during the last two 
decades have eloquently demonstrated the ever-intensifying trend of 
globalization-cum-interdependence.  This sea change tends to invite more 
open, integrationist thoughts than ever, free from rigid statist, sovereignty-
driven patterns of thought. 
From an economic perspective, the Lockean architecture—
cooperative rivalry—embedded in the GATT prototype was based largely 
on the nineteenth-century mercantilist reciprocity.  The classic production 
paradigm, under which any product would be harvested or manufactured 
                                                                                                                            
legal breach of GATT norms, GATT framers provided atypical remedies for those 
situations in which such expectations were unduly denied, i.e., when their potential benefits 
were nullified or impaired, even in the absence of any specific violation.  GATT Article 
XXIII:1 (b) provides this special cause of action, labeled “non-violation” claims, which the 
WTO DSU also endorses.  See generally Cho, supra note 257 (discussing and critiquing 
non-violation provisions of GATT/WTO dispute settlement system). 
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 See e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23, 
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, ¶ 17, 20 (1959) [WTO Doc. Symbol BISD/75/60].  
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operation of Law No. 949 had caused injury to United Kingdom commercial interests, and 
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entirely in one country (“mono-location”),261 led naturally to a “producer-
oriented” trade policy.262  In turn, this producer-oriented trade policy 
nurtured a mercantilist myth that export would be a virtue and import a 
vice.  A historically etched image of a sovereign country’s power and its 
national interest envisioned a mercantilist country amassing national wealth 
(foreign currencies) by promoting exports and discouraging imports.  
Imports, as concessions, were deemed mostly as prices paid for better 
market access.  In this situation, domestic producers are well positioned to 
lobby and capture their governments since their commercial interests are 
concentrated in this single-sourcing structure.  Thus, competition between 
domestic and foreign producers easily translated into competition between 
states that endeavor to maximize their net exports (exports minus imports).  
This mercantilist structure explains a conventional trade negotiation model, 
i.e., reciprocity, under which each trading nation acquires market access 
(export) from its trading partner only by offering corresponding concessions 
(import) to the latter.  According to this paradigm, the GATT/WTO, as a 
global Gesellschaft, exists to coordinate such reciprocal bargains whose 
ultimate purpose is to augment these material (commercial) values, which 
are equated with the titular “national interests.”   
More recently, however, technological innovations, in particular in 
the areas of transportation and telecommunication, have allowed businesses 
to pursue “trans”-national wealth and prosperity, challenging the sacrosanct 
notion of territoriality.263  A revolution in manufacturing patterns, such as 
“global supply chains,” has seriously diminished the territorial closure in 
international trade, which was once a hallmark of sovereignty (“multi-
location”).264  Under this sophisticated web of global sourcing networks, 
once parochially defined domestic trade interests have now expanded to 
every niche throughout the world.265  “The distinction between what is and 
what is not American or Finnish or Chinese has been blurred by foreign 
direct investment, cross-ownership, equity tie-ins, and transnational supply 
chains.”266   
In other words, made-in-China does not necessarily mean that every 
step of production would be conducted in China, as a recent study on the 
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iPod manufacturing powerfully demonstrates.267  Thanks to logistical 
innovations, a footloose manufacturer can now outsource multiple 
intermediate production stages to multiple countries.  Moreover, those 
factories manufacturing made-in-China products may even be owned by 
non-Chinese (foreign) investors.268  The old obsession with a “national 
origin” has increasingly become trifling in this new era of global 
sourcing.269  After all, these expanded trade opportunities tend to make the 
old mercantilist Gesellschaftian model anachronistic and force us to pierce 
the veil of a state so as to better observe what is really happening 
underneath.  Ranging from a T-shirt to an iPod, these “made in the 
world”270 products involve multiple economic players—both manufacturers 
and service providers—from multiple countries.  Here, more states and 
individual economic players can benefit from global commerce than the 
traditional mono-location model.  This multi-origin manufacturing structure 
tends to dilute the aforementioned obsession with mercantilist national 
interests.  Instead, these diversified and diffused configurations of trading 
nations (and traders) tend to care more about stability at the systematic level 
that secures their footloose transnational business activities than pre-
determined commercial rents.  Thus, the prevailing concept of trade has 
shifted from a “zero-sum” (mercantilist) or us versus them image to that of 
“positive-sum” or us and them.  Here, trading nations have become partners 
rather than rivals.271  The old paradigm cannot fully capture this new trade 
reality. 
Equally importantly, while the old paradigm’s realist-
Gesellschaftian legacy is undeniably at large, the institutional development 
of GATT/WTO for the last six decades has nonetheless revealed the 
burgeoning non-material (ideational and cognitive) elements in constructing 
the GATT/WTO.272  It is within this altered context in which constructivism 
can offer an appropriate tool to expound a norm-oriented evolution in the 
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operational governance of the world trading system.273  This new pattern of 
perceiving the WTO holds vital potential for its reconstruction because a 
new ontology of the world trading system—a community (Gemeinschaft) of 
law—based on the new way of thinking tends to generate new social 
realities around the WTO. 
From the “political bargain” perspective, the validity, which may be 
gauged by efficiency, of certain provisions would not matter much if they 
were bargained for other provisions in different issue areas.274  What is vital 
in a global Gesellschaft is that it maintains an overall balance of quid pro 
quo across issue areas.  The negotiation style, i.e., single-undertaking, 
reflects this cross-bargaining.  Subsequently, however, discourses on those 
rules develop in various discursive forums, such as the committee meetings 
or WTO dispute settlement proceedings.  These discourses transpire not 
necessarily within the context of an original political bargaining but more 
likely transpire against the teleological backdrop of the WTO legal system.  
In fact, this critical mismatch between Gesellschaftian positions from 
certain (powerful) members and Gemeinschaftian interpretations of the 
WTO often generates tensions.275   
Decades of institutional evolution under the GATT had begun to 
form a new legal dynamic.276  As the former Director of the WTO Appellate 
Body Secretariat Debra Steger observed, the GATT slowly evolved into 
“something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from by any 
contracting party whenever it found the obligations too onerous.”277  
Naturally, the material element of “nullification or impairment” was 
fossilized as it was simply presumed whenever a panel detected a 
“violation,” which as a cognitive-normative element became more 
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important to the community of law than its material consequences, i.e., 
nullification or impairment, such as the decrease of export.278  In fact, any 
violation would ipso facto constitute a nullification or impairment.279  
Overall, a successful institutionalization, in particular the juridicalization, of 
GATT, as represented by its well-operating dispute settlement mechanism, 
attests to the emerging presence of certain endogenous factors, such as 
shared norms, which would construct member states’ behaviors and 
identities. 
In sum, both external changes in the global trade environment and 
institutional transformations of the internal dynamics among trading nations 
as social actors tend to weaken the diagnostic force of the old realist-
Gesellschaftian paradigm within the WTO system. 
 
C.  The WTO’s Gesellschaftian Legacy and Its Normative Discontent 
  
In addition to the incomplete description of the new trade 
environment as well as internal institutional evolution, the old paradigm, 
when it functions as a modus operandi for state behavior, is also vulnerable 
to “normative” dilemmas.  For example, a narrow functionalist agenda, such 
as trade liberalization, enshrined in the original GATT contract could not 
fully address an enhanced goal of the newly created WTO, i.e., an 
“integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”  Only 
shared ideas and perceptions among WTO members can embrace such 
integration that often requires the reconciliation between trade and non-
trade values.280  Integration is a serious normative project that requires 
socio-cultural dynamics beyond contractual inputs.  
First of all, the contractual (Gesellschaftian) nature of the 
GATT/WTO is naturally prone to positive narratives of “power” and 
“economics,”281 as is often the case in a private contract.282  For example, 
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Richard Steinberg observes that powerful WTO members, such as the U.S. 
and the EU, can wield a unilateral veto power in the selection of the WTO 
Appellate Body members and even refuse to comply with its decisions that 
are unpleasant for domestic political reasons.283  From an economic 
standpoint, Alan Sykes applies a private contract model to the WTO 
remedies and advocates an “efficient breach” thesis.  Sykes contends that 
paying damages via compensation or suspension of concessions should be 
“an option for WTO Members” and that it is “both understandable and 
desirable” “as a matter of economic logic.”284  According to his economic 
logic, powerful (and wealthy) WTO members might be tempted to buy out 
their violations with impunity.285  Powerful members will maintain a global 
Gesellschaft so long as the benefits from reciprocal bargains (such as trade 
negotiations) exceed the costs of administration (such as the monitoring and 
enforcement of cheating (protectionism)).  Importantly, the power disparity 
within the global Gesellschaft inevitably accords powerful members a 
variety of advantages, such as more “bargaining space.”286 
The realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm’s other normative deficiency is 
that it is inherently vulnerable to capture: domestic politics, engineered by 
interest groups, shape287 or constrain288 trade policies.  Naturally, the old 
                                                                                                                            
“measurement,” both realist and liberal scholars wanted to demonstrate, in an aura of 
scientific alacrity, that states pursue the maximization of “utilities” and that a coordinated 
“game” toward cooperation is possible even among these egocentric state actors. See 
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 7, at 889–90. 
282
 See e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Power, Contract, and the Economic Model, 14 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 909 (1980) (observing that there are two categories of power in contract and 
economics). 
283
 See Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking, supra note 67, at 249 (contending that political 
constraints are difficult when powerful WTO members each have unilateral veto powers 
over Appellate Body member selections and can defy domestically unpopular political 
decisions by refusing to comply). 
284
 Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347, 347 (Marco 
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). 
285
 Id.; see also Cho, supra note 257. 
286
 See Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 387. 
287
 Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How it Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–21 
(2010) (arguing that strong lobbies from developed countries’ domestic interest groups, 
such as big pharmaceutical companies, pushed forth the launch of the TRIPS Agreement in 
the Uruguay Round). 
288
 See Timothy J. McKeown, Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the 
Demand for Protection, 36 WORLD POL. 215, 216 (1984) (observing that the civil society’s 
demands put constraints on the government’s tariff policies since ignoring such demands 
incur high political costs in the competitive political system).  
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paradigm preserves protectionism and mercantilism,289 which is 
symptomatic of the normative encroachment of the GATT/WTO system.  
This dyad of protectionism and mercantilism has in fact become a trade 
ontology itself.  Based on the realist structure,290 modern trade policies are 
based on a parochial assumption that exports are good and imports are 
bad.291  In the global Gesellschaft, the parochial domestic politics of 
powerful trading nations directly control trade negotiations.  Captured 
domestic governments, which are largely unresponsive to the general public 
(both domestic and global) welfare gains from open markets, repeat the 
same old protectionism seen in the interwar era.292  For example, powerful 
domestic lobby groups, such as the American Farm Bureau and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, tailgated the U.S. negotiators all the way to 
Geneva not only to monitor the negotiation but also to give instructions to 
negotiators.293  It is this die-hard mercantilist bargaining driven by a myopic 
obsession with exports as utilities and imports as disutilities which has 
deadlocked the Doha Round negotiation for the past decade. 
Consider why the Doha Round failed.  Interestingly, the old and the 
new paradigms tend to present two starkly different diagnoses and 
prescriptions over the aforementioned recent Doha debacle.  Under the old 
(rationalist) paradigm, as some WTO members argue, the debacle is yet 
another failed deal due to the failure of negotiators to discover a balanced 
                                                 
289
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bargain.294  Yet, the old paradigm is oblivious to the fact that the Doha 
Round was meant to be a “development” round.  While powerful members’ 
externalization of domestic interests may appear natural from a 
Gesellschaftian standpoint, it hardly addresses the solemn consequence that 
the Doha failure takes an enormous toll on the world’s poor.295  Ominously, 
the recent financial crisis only highlights this normative deficiency of the 
old paradigm, as the Gesellschaftian struggle might precipitate an entropic 
vision of the world.296 
More generally, protectionism is nothing but a “constitutional 
failure” in that special interests (factions) prevail over the general public 
welfare.297  These “normatively unfiltered interest positions” simply exploit 
law in according themselves the semblance of legitimacy.298  For example, 
the current U.S. Farm Bill continues to shower a lavish sum of federal 
subsidies mostly to rich corporate agro-businesses.299  At this juncture, one 
might recall that James Madison passionately warned against such special 
interests (“factions”) in the Federalist Papers.300  
Moreover, the old paradigm is largely ill-equipped to address new 
types of trade restrictions such as “non-tariff barriers” (NTBs).  After 
rounds of trade talks, conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, 
were dismantled dramatically.  In contrast, domestic regulations have begun 
to emerge as new trade barriers (NTBs) that rapidly replace tariffs and 
quotas.301  Concomitantly, as the era of the welfare state dawned, modern 
governments began to multiply domestic regulations in response to novel 
regulatory demands in such areas as the environment and human health.  
Left largely uncoordinated, these diverging domestic regulations themselves 
function as trade barriers even without protectionist intent.302  Of course, 
these domestic regulations, shrouded in legitimate social policies, often 
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cater to protectionist needs.303  Hard to measure, these administrative 
barriers cannot be simply bargained away.  Instead, they should be talked 
away. 
This is a serious challenge to the WTO qua institution.  Whether, or 
how far, should a trade organization tolerate non-protectionist, yet still 
trade-restrictive, measures?  How can the global trading system reconcile 
trade and non-trade (societal) values?  This is a systemic structural problem 
whose solution requires more than a conventional bargain based on routine 
strategic cost-benefit analysis under each member’s trade balance sheet.304  
Rather, it necessitates much collective thinking and soul-searching dialogue 
among trading nations, and their nationals (traders), on such cognitive 
issues as values, goals, and the collective identity of the global trading 
system.  
For example, the old paradigm might ascribe the failure to reach an 
international antitrust agreement in the WTO to the “great power divide” 
between the U.S. and the EU.305  As seen in high-profile cases such as 
GE/Honeywell and Microsoft, these two jurisdictions cannot form a firm 
consensus on how much the government should intervene to rectify the 
market dominance of powerful firms.306  Under the realist logic, powerful 
members such as the U.S. and the EU could not reconcile between 
themselves.307  Yet the old paradigm still fails to present how in the future 
such a clash could be avoided and a consensus formed.  More importantly, 
realism fails to highlight the lack of genuine regulatory dialogue between 
these two jurisdictions on this subject: two parties are simply not talking.  
The old paradigm’s status quo bias makes it difficult to envision new 
possibilities of regulatory cooperation in this sensitive area.  Behavioral 
changes necessary to global antitrust cooperation may ensue only after 
much collective thinking and discourse among regulators on critical issues 
such as the nature of market(s), the definition of (fair) competition, and the 
ultimate role (goal) of the government in a free market economy.308 
Finally, the status quo bias in the realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm 
tends to naturalize the marginalization of less powerful trading nations.  
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Such marginalization, prone to create frustration and resentment from 
developing countries,309 innately militates against its normative agenda, in 
particular its integrationist telos.310  For example, under the realist-
Gesellschaftian view, developed countries’ power-based threats forced 
developing countries to accept the protection of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS) in the Uruguay Round.  By linking the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) to development assistance programs such as Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), rich countries pressured developing countries into 
accepting the IPR protection regime.311  In addition, rich countries’ 
“aggressive unilateralism,” represented by Section 301, might potentially 
prosecute developing countries’ lack of IPR protection as a kind of unfair 
trade.312  While this realpolitik discourse may explain how and why the 
TRIPS regime came to light in the WTO, it nonetheless tends to overlook 
critical socio-legal debates as to whether the TRIPS’ existence within the 
WTO is normatively justified313 and how WTO members perceive, and 
eventually reform, this new regime, as revealed in certain contentious 
issues, such as AIDS drugs and human health.314  
As the Hobbesian “competition bias”315 still characterizes WTO 
trade negotiations under the old paradigm, it has also contributed to an ever-
deepening chasm between the North and the South.  The current global 
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financial crisis has aggravated development concerns due to the comatose 
Doha “Development” Round.  The world’s poor are hit hardest by these 
double troubles—the financial crisis and the comatose Doha Round—in our 
time.316  As experts predict a long period of jobless recovery from the 
financial crisis, the nascent political zeal for protectionism is likely to 
gather speed in the future.317  The real peril of protectionism nowadays is 
that it is rapidly “marginalizing” poor people from the mainstream global 
trading community.318  Shocking anecdotes abound.  The U.S. currently 
collects more tariffs from Bangladesh than from France!319  While the EU’s 
subsidy on every cow is $2 a day,320 more than half of the world’s human 
population lives with the same amount or less per day.321  Most 
problematically, rich countries’ protectionism falls on poor countries’ only 
lifeline products, such as African cotton,322 Moldovan fruits,323 and 
Cambodian garments.324 
Yet enhancing market access for poor countries’ main exports is not 
asking a “special favor,” but merely “playing by the [trade] rules.” 325  Many 
government subsidies in rich countries violate both the spirit and the letter 
of trade rules.  Nonetheless, rich countries, under the frustrating logic of 
mercantilist quid pro quo (reciprocity), repeatedly find fault with the lack of 
concessions from the poor countries even in the current “development” 
round.326 
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In sum, although the Kantian enlightenment pursuing collective 
prosperity via free trade had inspired the launch of the GATT prototype, 
power politics still fuels, and is fueled by, the aforementioned mercantilist 
trend.  This depressing pattern is confirmed by the recent protectionist 
trends in the aftermath of the global financial crisis327 as well as the 
deadlock of the Doha Round talks.328  Therefore, WTO members’ primary 
goal in their trade policies remains the maximization of the alleged national 
economic interests, even at the expense of their trading partners’ welfare.  
As long as WTO members perceive and construct international trade 
basically as a mercantilist enterprise, this shrinks the civilizing power of 
legal discourse in international trade relations.329  To that extent, the global 
trading system is never immune to the old Hobbesian economic 
balkanization.330  
This structural dilemma confronted by the WTO tends to call for a 
new paradigm in understanding the global trading system, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
D.  Toward the WTO’s Community (Gemeinschaft)  
 
1. The WTO as a Community of Law 
 
The aforementioned analytical and normative dilemmas of the old 
paradigm call for a new paradigm that focuses on certain cognitive 
properties of social interaction—such as ideas, norms and culture—among 
social actors (states).  The WTO is not a mere aspect of its members’ 
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actions and interactions like a contract (Gesellschaft), but rather a systemic 
social construct (Gemeinschaft) that ascribes cognitive values (meanings) to 
members’ behaviors.331  In this regard, the WTO “cannot be reduced to the 
activities carried out in its name” such as ministerial conferences and trade 
negotiations: “[i]t consists also of relatively enduring rules and norms that 
these actions draw upon, reproduce, and transform.”332 
As discussed above, the new WTO system has already 
demonstrated, albeit still in an inchoate stage, these constructivist attributes 
in the GATT/WTO’s record of institutional development.  This nascent 
constructivist turn within the WTO must further develop into a fully 
operating paradigm.  Only then can the new paradigm, which departs from 
the global Gesellschaft and builds the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, engage in a 
more precise analysis of trading nations’ behaviors as well as propose more 
normatively sound solutions to various normative challenges confronted by 
the global trading system.  Constructing a new paradigm (the WTO’s 
Gemeinschaft) from burgeoning institutional-sociological transformations 
within the WTO system should begin with its very object and purpose 
(telos).333 
With the launch of the WTO, this normative-cognitive parameter 
has become increasingly prominent both in the legal text and the 
jurisprudence.  For example, the WTO Agreement employed a more mature 
telos, i.e., “an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading 
system”334 than the narrow and sterilized one under the old GATT 
embodying a pro-trade bias, i.e., “the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade.”335  Likewise, WTO tribunals often adopt 
“teleological” interpretations to make sense of particular decisions against a 
broad theme of WTO’s object and purpose.336  After all, as long as the 
WTO remains a legal institution, it cannot fully separate its regulation of 
participants’ behaviors from collective goals.337  
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Markedly, the WTO’s integrationist telos closely corresponds with 
its rule-oriented transformation explicit in its new treaty setting.338  For 
example, the new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
eliminated the veto power in order to secure a normative efficacy within the 
system.  Under the old GATT dispute resolution mechanism, a WTO 
panel’s decision was legally binding only when all GATT contracting 
parties, including a losing one, agreed to adopt the decision.  This was yet 
another symptom of power-driven Gesellschaft since, unsurprisingly, 
powerful parties such as the U.S. often vetoed the adoption of GATT panel 
decisions when they were the losing party.  To remedy this lack of 
normative deficiency, the new WTO DSU eliminated this veto system and 
made the adoption process automatic.  
Ironically, the recent global financial crisis has only amplified the 
fateful necessity of a collective bond within the global trading system.  
While the crisis has negatively affected developing countries and their 
people, the post-crisis situation (“new normal”)339 has ironically put 
developing countries and their economic players in a position of a 
“solution” on account of their enormous growth potential that is superior to 
crisis-stricken developed countries.340  Developing countries must fully 
realize their development potential by actively connecting with the WTO’s 
community, i.e., by mainstreaming international trade, which will in turn 
engender global growth.  In this regard, although the new paradigm alone 
could not eliminate the development deficit in the immediate future, it could 
nonetheless stimulate a number of new ideas and projects that will shape a 
more desirable institutional path for the WTO by changing the way in 
which we understand the world trading system. 
This normative-teleological turn of the WTO warrants a 
constructivist interpretation.  Under constructivism, how WTO members 
understand their national interests would depend on the WTO’s norms and 
social structure.341  “Social structures have an inherently discursive 
                                                                                                                            
“express a universal will pure and simple,” laws also express “the particular wills of 
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dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and self- 
understandings that agents bring to their actions.”342  In other words, the 
WTO's norms and social structure “constitute” WTO members’ interests 
and preferences.  Being a WTO member is not a mere sum of rights and 
privileges under the WTO agreements.  A WTO membership also connotes 
certain social benefits like belongingness, assurance, and even prestige 
derived from a certain social status in the world trading system.  This 
explains why so many countries—in particular, developing countries such 
as China, Vietnam, and Russia—have been so eager to become WTO 
members.343 
The constructivist interpretation of GATT/WTO centering on social 
—cognitive and intersubjective—parameters generates communitarian 
(Gemeinschaftian) images of GATT/WTO, such as “dense and demanding 
social ties” and “common beliefs in an idea system.”344  First of all, the 
enhanced visibility of shared goals (free trade and market integration) 
manifest both in the WTO text and its jurisprudence helps WTO members 
converge their normative expectations, which is a prerequisite for building a 
collective identity of community.345  Perhaps the very fact that the WTO is 
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the most successful international organization in the postwar era,346 as 
measured by its continuing operational effectiveness as well as ever-
expanding agendas and membership, speaks to the potential communitarian 
nature of the WTO.  
Importantly, this communitarian solidarity reifies, and at the same 
time is reified by, a well-developed and sophisticated set of norms as a 
communicative device whose “generative grammar” and “underlying 
principles of order and meaning” shape the contour of GATT/WTO’s 
institutional development.347  WTO norms as a communication device 
denote the “logic of appropriateness” in a sociological sense, which derives 
from certain “patterns of practice” as well as “shared understandings or 
behavioral expectations.”348  In sum, WTO members see themselves as a 
“we” bound by common norms as a “symbolic mode of communication.”349  
Therefore, in this WTO’s Gemeinschaft, trading partners should be 
perceived more as “customers, suppliers, and potential collaborators instead 
of competitive threats.”350  Once trading partners share the same 
communicative foundation, their relationships could be more cooperative 
than competitive because such foundation provides the “structure of 
meanings that defines action” in our common realm.351 
Since the WTO discourse assumes a legal vehicle (such as rhetoric, 
arguments, and narratives) to channel individual ideas to collective 
action,352 the WTO’s “logic of communication”353 or its members’ 
“communicative action”354 cannot be but through law. Here, an analogy of 
language is useful for the constructivist understanding of the WTO’s 
community as a community of law.355  Certain “semantic regularities,”356 
such as case law and precedents, administer the WTO’s community in that 
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this WTO jurisprudence features “lexico-grammatical” aspects357 of WTO 
and thus shape meanings of the WTO text within the WTO’s own socio-
cultural context.  The WTO norms as “linguistic phenomena” are 
“embedded”358 in the WTO’s history, institutional evolution, and internal 
dynamics.359  Thus WTO members “work [] together creatively to refashion 
the linguistically structured symbols of social cohesion which serve as the 
resources for intersubjective experience, with the aim of motivating 
action.”360  As far as the WTO is concerned, a community-building process 
is a norm-building process.  Here, the WTO norms hold the “duality of 
praxis” in that they are used to transmit intentional claims and arguments of 
members, and at the same time, they reproduce themselves and become 
taken for granted.361 
The growing prominence of international trade law, both in 
academia and in practice, helps this lingua franca of international trade law 
circulate farther.362  For example, Professor John Jackson, the leading 
international trade law scholar whose critical influence played a critical role 
in building the current form of the WTO system, launched the Journal of 
International Economic Law (JIEL) in 1998 to lead and develop academic 
discourses on international trade law issues.363  A few years later, none but 
the WTO Secretariat itself embarked on the publication of the World Trade 
Review (WTR) for a similar purpose.364  Importantly, these academic 
initiatives have helped spread international trade law discourses not only to 
scholars but also to policymakers, business circles, and the general public. 
These WTO Secretariat staff, WTO tribunal members, trade 
lawyers, trade law scholars may be labeled “discursive agents”365 in that 
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they collectively preserve and develop trade law ideas and discourses in 
what Vivien Schmidt calls a “coordinative policy sphere.”366  As “sentient” 
agents,367 they do not mechanically apply pre-existing legal texts but 
creatively criticize, deliberate, and construct policies and norms.  Granted, 
those discursive agents may initially confront each other with different 
“terms” of discourse as their meaning structures channeling their thoughts 
and actions diverge.368  Yet the dialectical interactions among themselves, 
which is endemic to the discourse, tend to lead it toward a converging point.  
Notably, discourses transpiring within the WTO by those discursive agents 
do not only concern particular policies or programs; they also touch upon a 
deeper “public philosophy” that is often “left unarticulated as background 
knowledge” to most actors in the WTO.369  Therefore, when these 
discursive agents (such as the WTO Appellate Body members) reconstruct 
trade norms via “constitutional” adjudication against parochial interests, 
they explicitly or implicitly engage in a discourse on the very telos of the 
WTO.370   
From this standpoint, trade norms are no longer exogenously given 
as mere records of a sovereign contract.  Instead, trade norms are now 
“endogenously” self-generating via intersubjective, communicative, and 
cultural discourses among participants of the world trading community, 
which connotes not only state actors but also individual economic players, 
such as producers, investors, importers, consumers, and even scholars and 
policymakers.371  A plethora of discursive practices and rituals, most of 
which have been institutionalized as norms—substantive (such as 
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jurisprudence) and procedural (such as the DSU)—over the past six 
decades, are reflections of the social order within the context of the 
WTO.372  “They are signals and symbols of the appropriateness of events, 
not in the sense that what happened needs to be viewed as desirable or 
pleasant, but in the sense that what happened can be viewed as having 
occurred in the way things happen.”373 
Ironically, certain material incentives also contribute to this 
development of endogenous legal discourses.  As individual economic 
players, or transnational businesspeople, are saddled with cross-border 
mergers, multinational joint-ventures, and global supply chains, they 
understandably seek stability and predictability informed by rule of law, 
such as lex mercatoria, rather than unpredictable domestic politics.  For the 
same reason, individual economic players also tend to have the WTO’s 
modus operandi based on a consistent set of norms equivalent to a jus 
gentium or common law of international trade rather than on whimsical 
political contingencies.374  As Jürgen Habermas aptly observed, normative 
discourses can “transform mentalities” of government official and citizens, 
and thus internalize the “new legal construction of the international 
community.”375  
 
2. The Egalitarian Content of International Trade Law 
 
Critically, the ultimate destination of this cognitive-communicative 
construction of international trade law is a long-forgotten “egalitarian 
content” of law.376  Legal discourse retains its egalitarian nature with 
inclusiveness and perspective-taking.377  This embedded egalitarianism has 
largely been eclipsed by realism, under which law is merely “reflections of 
unstable and shifting interest constellations among powers.”378  In this 
sense, constructivism inoculates the “pernicious effects of the self-interest 
theory” which “bring[] out the worst in us” by “encouraging us to expect 
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the worst in others.”379  
The current WTO system has at least demonstrated some 
possibilities for a kind of egalitarian legal discourse.  For example, the 
WTO’s High Court—the Appellate Body—highlights the vitality of taking 
into account the predicaments faced by other trading in implementing one’s 
own domestic policies when such policies exert negative externalities on 
those trading partners.380  The Appellate Body mandates a regulating 
country to reach out to its trading partners and establish some cooperative 
arrangements to avoid these negative (trade-restrictive) impacts.  
Cooperation, which may be defined as one party’s behavioral change 
“contingent on” that of others, is a benign, albeit not inevitable, 
consequence of discourse.381  For example, the WTO’s side agreements, 
such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS), impose on WTO members a plethora of procedural 
disciplines, such as notification, transparency, and reason-giving.  These 
disciplines intend to facilitate regulatory dialogue and cooperation between 
regulating countries and those affected by the former’s regulations.382  In 
short, these legal—both textual and interpretive—changes under the new 
WTO system signify a paradigmatic shift from control to communication.383 
The aforementioned egalitarian trade discourse symbolizes an 
institutional maturity under which the WTO can grow out of its narrow-
minded pro-trade bias and embrace a “trade constitution” within the WTO 
system.384  On account of this emerging communicative paradigm, a new 
form of cognitive connection tends to emerge between exporting and 
importing (regulating) countries that enhances trade sensitivity in the 
latter’s regulatory process.  With such trade sensitivity, the importing 
(regulating) country is more willing to consider any negative trade impact 
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that its regulation may exert on the exporting country.  Here, various 
avenues of legal discourse under the WTO system, such as the notification 
and enquiry function under the SPS Agreement, help both importing and 
exporting countries stay tuned to the same cognitive radar.  Eventually, such 
a cognitive bond between importing and exporting countries empowers the 
WTO to overcome an original pro-trade bias under the old GATT by 
contributing to a more effective reconciliation between trade and non-trade 
(e.g., the environment) values.  This normative dimension of a trade 
constitution cannot be fully captured by Gesellschaftian properties (i.e., 
interest, bargain, and negotiation).  
Concededly, constructivism cannot simply assume away Hobbesian 
competition.  The enduring protectionism may still undermine the emerging 
Gemeinschaftian discourse within the WTO community of law.  For 
example, powerful trading nations want to negotiate away their compliance 
with an adjudicated decision.  The U.S. defied the WTO and refused to fully 
comply with the 2004 WTO Appellate Body decision ordering the 
elimination of certain cotton subsidies.  Instead, the U.S. linked these 
subsidy cuts to the agricultural negotiation under the current Doha 
Round.385  Therefore, one should not equate a new paradigm with the 
reality.386  There may still be some gaps between the idealist structure 
envisioned by the new paradigm (constructivism) and a certain type of 
reality that the conventional paradigm (realism) may explain better.  As the 
former GATT official Jan Tumlir aptly observed, WTO members might be 
tempted to discard any new way of thinking in the face of protectionist 
pressure from their home fronts in a “cycle of learning and unlearning.”387  
In this regard, constructivism could, and should, not claim a disciplinary 
monopoly in understanding the WTO.  After all, any communitarian bond 
in the WTO might be loose enough to yield occasionally to materialistic 
considerations.  
Nonetheless, the new paradigm does provide us with creative 
pathways toward a better future.  The constructivist narrative on the WTO’s 
community (Gemeinschaft) based on legal discourse offers a powerful 
avenue in reconstructing the WTO’s nomos in a way that can effectively 
transform mercantilist politics.  The WTO’s community could raise the cost 
of maintaining mercantilism-protectionism by altering the nature of national 
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interests in trade relations.  In the WTO community of law, a wide array of 
individual economic players, such as importers, transporters, insurers, 
bankers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, can benefit from an orderly 
and stable legal environment, while politically well-connected domestic 
producers might still prefer lobbying politicians for special interests.  
Therefore, in the WTO’s community where both trading nations and 
individual economic players interact and communicate with one another via 
a language of (international trade) law, mercantilism-protectionism results 
in an enormous decrease in the collective welfare—both domestically and 
internationally—only to serve a handful of special interests.  
In sum, the WTO’s community as a community of law could help 
modify the Gesellschaftian nature of power and interest.  Then, it can serve 
a broader circle of economic participants within the global trading system 
by envisaging an expanded horizon of collective gains from trade that used 
to be eclipsed by the old mercantilist-protectionist paradigm.388  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article argues that the old paradigm on IOs characterized by 
realist political bargain (Gesellschaft) cannot fully capture new social 
realities around contemporary IOs in which ideational factors, such as ideas, 
values, culture, and norms, have become more salient and influential not 
only in explaining but also in prescribing state behaviors.  In response to 
this challenge, the Article offers a new paradigm informed by 
constructivism that highlights a reflective, intersubjective communication 
among IO members and consequent norm-building process.  Under this new 
paradigm, one can understand an IO as a “community” (Gemeinschaft), not 
as  a mere contractual instrument of its member states.  The Article applies 
the new paradigm to the WTO as it explains the WTO’s institutional 
evolution from a power-oriented, tariff-reducing contract to a norm-
oriented world trading community. 
The paradigm shift proposed in this Article holds both descriptive 
and normative connotations.  On the one hand, the Article highlights the 
increasing unfitness of the old paradigm as it elucidates new social realities 
around IOs.  For example, the Article argues that the constructivist 
understanding of the WTO system could explain, better than realism, why 
trade disputes, albeit often escalated, do not entail trade wars akin to the 
interwar economic balkanization.  The “complex interdependence” among 
WTO members, which is defined by its characteristic high frequency-
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density of their interactions, multiple issues involved, and multiple channels 
of communication (private and public; formal and informal), has nurtured a 
solid communitarian bond harnessed by sophisticated trade norms.389  This 
fateful tiding tends to make the use of retaliation less practical, if not 
completely obsolete.390  This complex interdependence in trade relations, 
evidenced by such phenomena as global supply/production chains, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investments, and 
international trade finances, has shifted WTO members’ worldviews from a 
zero-sum world to a positive-sum world.391  Under this unique condition, 
WTO members tend to define their self-interests differently from what 
realists would do.392 
On the other hand, however, the Article also sheds light on the 
future of IOs—how to redesign and reform the current IOs.  Polemical as 
they may seem, the aforementioned diverging views on IOs denote a 
fundamentally paradigmatic concern.  In other words, these different views 
betray certain assumptions that an inquirer unconsciously holds in 
constructing the reality around an IO.393  We may see only what we are 
prepared to see.394  Moreover, how we understand the reality, in turn, 
determines how we change it.  Given the ubiquity of IOs, whose coverage 
ranges from the financial crisis (International Monetary Fund)395 to 
development (World Bank),396  in the era of globalization,397 one may not 
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take lightly this ontological inquiry of the IO.   
For example, the old paradigm, if left unchecked, will lead 
eventually to a normative tension among trading nations by aggravating 
mercantilist competition, as witnessed in the current Doha crisis.398  As long 
as negotiators are obsessed with a mirage of perfect “bargain,” the 
normative foundation of the Doha Round, i.e., “development,” will never 
fully materialize.  Here, the new paradigm is capable of providing us with a 
creative pathway toward a better future.  The power of discourse, 
communication, learning, and enlightenment in the WTO’s legal 
community is capable of closing the frustrating gaps between trade norms 
and trade realities.  Only this endogenous, self-generating process can 
emancipate the WTO system from an exogenous realist, and at the same 
time defeatist, trap under which “legal provisions can be nothing other than 
reflections of unstable and shifting interest constellations among 
powers.”399  
In conclusion, the new paradigm’s constructivist narratives toward 
an IO’s community (Gemeinschaft) offer a powerful avenue in 
reconstructing an IO in a way that can effectively address chronic 
cooperation deficiencies that an IO is and will be experiencing in the future.  
Within the community, states do not need to agree on everything: they 
could just “get used to” and eventually “make sense of” one another.400  
After all, the main message of the new paradigm is a “moral” thesis, which 
aspires to espouse “human progress” via IOs.401   
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